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This study evaluates the information in financial analysts earnings forecasts about 
firms that subsequently restate their earnings.  We compare the analyst forecasts 
for restatement firms versus non-restatement firms before restatement 
announcement.  We find that analysts tend to issue more optimistic forecasts for 
restatement firms in the period when earnings were misstated as well as in the 
year before the restatement announcement.  This finding supports the criticism in 
GAO Report (2002) and Coffee (2002) that financial analysts fail to perform their 
gatekeeper role competently and alarm investors to the upcoming earnings 
restatement.  However, we find that the analyst forecasts in aggregate have more 
disparity in their opinions on the restatement firms earnings.  Restatement firms 
are found to have larger forecast dispersion than non-restatement firms in the year 
prior to restatement announcement.  It suggests that the forecast dispersion reflects 
greater earnings uncertainty around restatement firms before the restatement 
announcement.  Moreover, the forecast dispersion before earnings restatement 
provides helpful information to the market in forming aggregate wisdom about the 
upcoming restatement.  This result supports Malatesta and Thompson (1985) that 
partially anticipated events have mitigated market response at the time of the 
announcement.  Forecast dispersion before the earnings restatement is also shown 
to correlate with the firms subsequent risk after the restatement.   Our results 
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CHAPTER 1 INTRODUCTION 
 
1.1 Background of the study 
 
Since late 1990s, a growing number of large firms have been restating their 
financial statements, eliminating billions of dollars of earnings from previously 
reported numbers. Besides wiping off billions of dollars of market value, these 
restatements also call into question the credibility of the firms accounting 
practices and the quality of the corporate oversight.  In his speech at the New 
York University Center for Law and Business, former Securities and Exchange 
Commission (SEC) Chairman Arthur Levitt remarks:  
 I fear that we are witnessing an erosion in the quality of 
earnings, and therefore, the quality of financial reporting If a 
company fails to provide meaningful disclosure to investors 
about where it has been, where it is and where it is going, a 
damaging pattern ensues.  The bond between shareholders and 
the company is shaken; investors grow anxious; prices fluctuate 
for no discernible reasons; and the trust that is the bedrock of our 
capital markets is severely tested 
 
It is thus not surprising to witness a series of negative consequences triggered by 
earnings restatement, among which are shareholder class-action suit, SEC 
sanction, management turnover, resignation and dismissal of outside auditors, and 
collapse of the firms stock price.  Given the significant impact of earning 
restatement on the capital markets, shareholders, and the restatement firms 
themselves, it merits an in-depth investigation.   




The growing number of earnings restatements reflects weakness in the chain of 
several parties involved in the current corporate governance and financial 
reporting system.  It is first of all a failure of the internal control system within the 
restatement firms. Moreover, the sharp drop in stock prices upon the restatement 
announcement also highlights the failure of auditors, financial analysts and credit 
rating agencies to alert investors and creditors who lost huge dollars.  On the 
contrary, analysts are found to issue buy recommendations on firms that soon after 
restate their earnings and experience dramatic decline in market value (see Coffee 
2002).  
 
The incidence of earnings restatement announcement provides a special setting to 
study financial analysts earnings forecast. Earlier research on the financial 
analysts earnings forecast (FAF) finds that FAF are more accurate than forecasts 
produced by statistical and time-series forecast models and reflects comprehensive 
information (e.g. Brown and Rozeff, 1979; Fried and Givoly, 1982; OBrien, 1988; 
and Alexander, 1995). However, FAF are also documented to exhibit systematic 
upward bias. That is, the forecast earnings are consistently higher than the 
reported earnings (e.g. Abarbanell, 1991; Brown et al, 1985; Stickel, 1990).  
Moreover, analysts are found to sit on bad news and respond slowly (Hong et al, 
2000).  Therefore, we are interested to evaluate the properties of FAF for the 
restatement versus non-restatement firms during the misstated period as well as in 
the year right before the restatement announcement. Specifically, is there 
information in financial analysts forecasts about firms that subsequently restate 
their earnings?   




1.2 Objective of the study 
 
Though earnings restatement can be initiated for various reasons (to be discussed 
in detail in chapter two), this study limits its scope to those earnings restatements 
arising from accounting errors, aggressive accounting practices and accounting 
irregularities. Such earnings restatements are evident signals that the affected 
financial statements lack integrity and reliability, and that the management lacks 
competence or credibility in their oversight.  These kinds of earnings restatements 
often have negative effects on the firms, including the decrease in expected future 
earnings and the increase in cost of capital (Hribar and Jenkins, 2004).  We are 
interested to examine the role of financial analysts in producing and disseminating 
information about these earnings restatement firms. In particular, do FAF contain 
any predictive information about the earnings restatement firms?  
  
This study aims to address four issues. Firstly, do FAF reflect the true financial 
performance of the restatement firms in the misstated period? To do so, we 
examine the difference in the FAF of restatement and non-restatement firms for 
the period that the restatement firms report misleading earnings. 
 
Secondly, is there predictive information in the current-year FAF one year prior to 
the earnings restatement announcement?  Previous studies examine the response 
of FAF to the earnings restatement and find downward forecast revision, decrease 
in forecast error and increase in forecast dispersion after the earnings restatement 
announcement (Palmrose et al, 2004; Griffin, 2003). In this study, we examine the 
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FAF before the earnings restatement announcement to evaluate if there is any 
information about the subsequent restatement.  We compare the difference in 
properties of FAF between restatement and non-restatement firms in the year prior 
to the restatement announcement.  Three properties of the FAF are evaluated: the 
forecast error, the forecast dispersion and the skewness of the forecast distribution.   
 
Thirdly, does the market have aggregate wisdom about the circumstances leading 
to the restatement announcement? If the market in aggregate has knowledge of the 
inflated earnings, there will be a pre-restatement announcement drift in stock 
prices for the earnings restatement firms. Furthermore, the markets reaction to the 
restatement announcement would be mitigated to the extent that such information 
is already embedded in the FAF distribution. 
 
Fourthly, does the uncertainty that is reflected in the FAF distribution for the 
restatement firms correlate with the increase in firm risk after the earnings 
restatement?  We examine the relationship between the properties of FAF 
distribution and the increase in risk measures of the restatement firms.    
 
1.3 Contribution of the study 
 
The phenomenon of earnings restatement has drawn researchers attention in 
recent years following the accounting scandals of large firms like Enron and 
WorldCom.  The growing number of earnings restatements due to accounting 
errors and irregularities reflects deterioration of corporate governance and 
stimulates academic interests. Recent studies on earnings restatement differ in 
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their research emphasis, for example, capital market reaction to the announcement 
of earnings restatement (Anderson and Yohn, 2002; Wu, 2002), the managers 
incentives to misstate earnings (Richardson et al, 2002), the corporate governance 
characteristics of the restatement firms (Agrawal and Chadha, 2003), etc.   
 
This study adds to the literature on earnings restatement by examining the role of 
financial analysts in securities markets, specifically, in their analysis of firms that 
subsequently restate the earnings. Financial analysts are important intermediaries 
in the securities markets. They are deemed sophisticated and efficient in 
information collection, procession and dissemination.  However, their gatekeeper 
role is being questioned given the recent spate of earnings restatements (Coffee, 
2002; GAO Report, 2002).  This paper reinforces such criticism as financial 
analysts issue more optimistic forecasts for restatement firms than for non-
restatement firms before the restatement announcement.  Not only do consensus 
analyst forecasts not reveal information about the true financial performance of 
the restatement firms and their subsequent restatement, the excessive optimism 
towards restatement firms in fact suggests serious conflicts of interest. 
 
Notwithstanding, this study finds that financial analysts in aggregate have greater 
disagreement in their opinions of the restatement firms earnings.  Restatement 
firms have larger forecast dispersion than non-restatement firms before the 
restatement announcement.  Our results suggest that the distribution of analyst 
forecasts carries information about the uncertainty over restatement firms 
earnings prior to their restatement announcements.   
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To strengthen the case that FAF may yet carry some information about 
restatement firms, this study also finds that the greater forecast dispersion before 
the earnings restatement mitigates the market response to the restatement 
announcement.  This finding is consistent with Malatesta and Thompson (1985) 
that partially anticipated events experience alleviated market reaction when the 
events are publicly announced. It suggests that forecast dispersion does inform, 
quite inexplicably, the market about the subsequent earnings restatement.  We also 
find that such forecast dispersion of the restatement firms is associated with firm 
risk after the restatement announcement.   However, we note that such information 
is found in aggregated data from a sample of restatement firms that is constructed 
ex-post.  It would be a challenge to extract information from FAF of a specific 
firm that can predict earnings restatement. 
 
This study has a relatively complete sample of firms that made earnings 
restatements from 1990 through 2002.  As the manual search for earnings 
restatement is tedious work, most studies on earnings restatement sample 
restatements of annual earnings before 2000 only. Since the number of earnings 
restatement balloons after 1996 before peaking in 2001, the inclusion of earnings 
restatements made in year 2001 and 2002 allows for a more comprehensive study.  
 
1.4 Scope and organization of the study 
 
This study samples US firms listed in NYSE, AMEX and NASDAQ that make 
earnings restatements due to accounting errors, aggressive accounting principles, 
and accounting irregularities from 1990 to 2002.  Chapter Two includes the review 
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of studies on financial analysts earnings forecasts.  It also gives an overview of 
earnings restatement and relevant studies on alleged earnings manipulation.  
Chapter Three develops the hypotheses.  Data, sampling procedures and method 
are discussed in Chapter Four. Chapter Five presents the findings and analysis. 
Finally, Chapter Six concludes the study with implications and suggestions for 
future research. 
Chapter 2                                                                                              Literature Review 
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CHAPTER 2 LITERATURE REVIEW 
2.1 Overview 
 
This review includes two parts.  The first part discusses previous studies on 
financial analysts earnings forecasts (FAF), while the second part reviews studies 
related to earnings restatement.   
 
2.2 Role of financial analysts and their earnings forecasts  
 
Theories of financial intermediation suggest that transaction costs and asymmetric 
information are two major reasons explaining the existence of financial 
intermediaries like investment bankers, stock brokers and financial analysts 
(Gurley and Shaw, 1960; Leland and Pyle, 1977). They argue that financial 
intermediaries can invest in wealth that they have special knowledge with and 
overcome the problems of asymmetric information by acting as delegated 
monitors (Diamond, 1984).  Financial analysts play a significant role in 
providing investors with information that may affect investment decisions. 
Through research on the current and prospective financial information of certain 
publicly traded firms, they report earnings forecasts for the firms and make 
recommendations about investing in those firms securities.  Financial analysts 
extensive exploration on information about the firm and its businesses, its 
customers, its suppliers, and its industry warrants them the service fee.  
 
However, the growing number of earnings restatements and the accompanying 
problems in financial reporting bring about many criticisms on the financial 
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analysts roles.  According to GAO Report (2002), many financial analysts 
recommend investment in now-bankrupt firms and fail to downgrade ratings for 
those firms before the accounting problems are disclosed, such as in the cases of 
Enron and WorldCom.  
 
This study examines the role of financial analysts with respect to earnings 
restatement firms. It addresses the question whether analyst forecasts for 
restatement firms contain predictive information about the subsequent earnings 
restatement.  For the purpose of this study we review in the following sections the 
previous literature of FAF and the association of analysts forecasts with irregular 
events within and outside the capital markets.   
 
2.2.1 Properties of financial analysts earnings forecast (FAF) 
 
There is extensive research exploring the properties of financial analysts earnings 
forecasts and their implications.  Two major properties frequently covered are the 
accuracy and the dispersion of FAF. 
 
Accuracy of FAF 
 
Much research has been conducted to evaluate the accuracy of FAF collected from 
different sources at different forecast horizons by employing different time-series 
benchmark models, error measures and statistical tests.  The findings of these 
studies, though not in unanimous agreement, tend to suggest that analysts produce 
earnings predictions that are more accurate than those generated by time-series 
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models (Brown and Rozeff, 1979; Fried and Givoly, 1982; OBrien, 1988; and 
Alexander, 1995).     
 
Previous studies on the superiority of FAF to time-series models suggest that FAF 
contains comprehensive information including macroeconomic events, industry 
information and firm-specific non-accounting information, while time-series 
models rely exclusively on accounting information. Compared with time-series 
models, FAF appears to have both a contemporaneous advantage and a timing 
advantage (Brown et al, 1987a).  The contemporaneous advantage means that 
financial analysts can better use information existing by the time that time-series 
models are applied, and the timing advantage means that the financial analysts can 
use information that occurs after the cut-off date for the time-series models but 
before the report of the analysts forecasts. 
 
Research has been extended to examine how the superiority of FAF over time-
series models is related to the firms information environment. Brown et al (1987) 
find that the analysts superiority increases when the firm has richer information 
set and decreases when there is greater earnings uncertainty around the firm.  
They use firm size as proxy for the richness of a firms information set, and 
divergence of analysts opinions as proxy for the firms earnings uncertainty.  
Kross et al (1990) find that the advantage of FAF over time-series models grows 
with increasing information gathering incentives and information dissemination 
activities, measured as the extent of the firms exposure in The Wall Street 
Journal.  
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Studies also show that the accuracy of FAF is related to firms financial risk and 
business risk, and the error in earnings forecasts is associated with the uncertainty 
that a firm faces. Cukierman and Givoly (1982) develop a model of earnings 
expectations and they show that the cross-sectional error in earnings forecasts is 
the correct empirical counterpart of uncertainty; that is, the dispersion of expected 
earnings. Ciccone (2003) finds that for all the US firms listed on the NYSE, 
AMEX and NASDAQ from 1978 to 1996, the forecast error has a positive 
relationship with the standard deviation of annual earnings in the three previous 
years prior to the year of forecast.  Moreover, the firms with large forecast errors 
are more likely to have negative earnings and earnings declines.  He concludes 
that firms that are distressed have systematically higher forecast error.   
 
Optimistic bias of FAF 
 
Empirical studies show that FAF exhibit optimistic bias on average, which means 
that the analysts forecasts are systematically higher than the reported earnings 
(Barefield and Comiskey, 1975; OBrien, 1988; Stickel, 1990; Arbanell, 1991). 
Researchers have proposed different explanations for this observed bias. One 
explanation of the forecast optimism is based on the incentives of financial 
analysts, i.e., they benefit from issuing optimistic earnings forecasts.  The benefits 
include promoting brokerage commissions, maintaining sound relations with 
investment banking clients, and cultivating corporate managers to ensure private 
information access (Francis and Philbrick, 1993; Dugar and Nathan, 1995; Das et 
al., 1998; Lim, 2001).  Griffin (2003) offers a cost explanation of the bias, i.e., bad 
news is costly to learn and analysts will analyze it only when there are higher 
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benefits to make the analysis worthwhile.  Another reason proposed by Abarnell 
and Bernard (1992) is that the financial analysts have cognitive bias in processing 
information related to the firms future performance and therefore make 
systematic errors in their forecasts.  
 
Lim (2001) proposes a theoretical model to show that under a quadratic-loss 
utility function, analysts trade off bias to cultivate management and access 
nonpublic information flows.  He argues that firms with more uncertain 
information environments are the firms with whom the analysts find it more 
important to build management access and are associated with more optimistic 
forecasts.  By using quarterly forecasts in I/B/E/S from 1984 to 1996, he finds that 
proxies for the extent of a firms information environment, such as firm size and 
analyst coverage, are inversely related to forecast bias.  Moreover, he finds that 
another proxy for firm specific uncertainty, the standard deviation of weekly 
excess stock returns, is positively related to forecast bias.   
 
Dispersion of FAF 
 
Prior research has examined the relationship between dispersion in analysts 
earnings forecasts and the uncertainty about firms future economic performance 
and provided empirical evidence on such relationship.  Givoly and Lakonishok 
(1984) argue that the level of forecast dispersion is perceived by investors as 
valuable information about the level of uncertainty concerning firms future 
economic performance.  Forecast dispersion is suggested to reflect both 
uncertainty and lack of consensus among market participants about future events 
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(Barry and Jennings 1992; Barron, Kim, Lim and Stevens 1998). Givoly and 
Lakonishok (1988) examine the relationship between dispersion of FAF, used as a 
measure of uncertainty, and the firms stock properties, particularly risk 
characteristics, such as beta, marketability, firm size, and earnings growth 
variability.  They find a positive and significant association between forecast 
dispersion and the traditional market-based risk measure (beta) and the 
accounting-based risk measure (earnings growth variability), and a negative 
although insignificant correlation between size and forecast dispersion.  They also 
find a positive association between forecast dispersion and marketability.  
 
Malkiel (1981) uses a measure of the dispersion of Wall Street security analysts 
opinions concerning the future earnings and dividend growth of the firm as a risk 
variable, and he compares this risk variable with other risk variables such as beta, 
inflation risk, interest rate risk, and economic activity risk with respect to expected 
returns.  His results show that dispersion of analysts forecast produces the highest 
correlations with expected returns with the highest significance.  He suggests that 
firms for which there is a broad consensus among financial analysts with respect 
to the future earnings and dividends seem to be less risky than those for which 
there is little agreement among the analysts. He concludes that dispersion of FAF 
is the best single measure of systematic risk available.  
 
Imhoff and Lobo (1992) use dispersion in analyst forecasts as a measure of ex 
ante earnings uncertainty, which may reflect either the fundamental uncertainty of 
a firms future cash flows or noise in the financial reporting system. They examine 
dispersion of analysts forecasts reported in the month prior to the actual annual 
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earnings announcements from 1979 to 1984 and divide the firm-year observations 
into three strata based on the ranking of forecast dispersion.  Their results show a 
negative relationship between Earnings Response Coefficient and forecast 
dispersion, which is consistent with the argument that dispersion reflects 
uncertainty.  They further conclude that the earnings uncertainty reflected in the 
forecast dispersion originates largely from noise in the financial reporting system 
rather than the fundamental uncertainty in the firms future cash flow, and that the 
greater ex ante earnings uncertainty is a signal of lower quality of the earnings 
information.   
 
Barron and Stuerke (1998) construct a forecast dispersion measure from forecasts 
that are revised during the first 30 days following announcements of either prior 
year annual earnings or current year interim earnings, and calculate it as the 
standard deviation of revised forecasts divided by the mean revised forecast.  
They compile their forecast observations from I/B/E/S Detail data from 1990 to 
1994, and find a positive association between ex ante dispersion and the 
magnitude of price reactions around subsequent earnings releases, even after 
controlling for other measures of uncertainty like beta and the variance of stock 
returns. They postulate that dispersion in FAF serves as a useful indicator of 
uncertainty about the price relevant component of firms future earnings. 
 
In summary, previous studies show that dispersion among analyst forecasts 
reflects uncertainty of the firms future economic performance, though whether 
such uncertainty originates from the uncertainty of the underlying future cash 
flows or the noise in the accounting information is not resolved.  
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2.2.2 Analysts forecasts and irregular events  
 
Some studies have related the research on analysts forecasts to certain events 
outside the security market to test how the properties of analysts forecasts change 
with respect to these events. They have drawn inference on the association 
between analysts forecast for the firm and the specific event.    
 
Moses (1990) examines differences in FAF properties between bankrupt and 
healthy firms and investigates whether measures developed from FAF are useful 
indicators of impending bankruptcy. He studies firms that declared bankruptcy 
from 1977 to 1985 and collects FAF data from I/B/E/S Summary Data for four 
years prior to bankruptcy.  He then matches each bankrupt firm with a non-
bankrupt firm from the same industry and of approximately the same size 
resulting in a total sample of 136 firms.  His results show that compared with the 
healthy firms, the failing firms have significantly larger error in forecast EPS up to 
as early as four years prior to failure and more optimistic bias from three years 
before the bankruptcy. Bankrupt firms have larger forecast dispersion from three 
years prior to failure than the healthy firms do.  They also have consistently 
increasing dispersion in forecasts both within and across years in the three years 
prior to failure. These results are consistent with the notion that uncertainty 
increases as failure approaches.  He concludes that analysts forecasts do reflect 
conditions that are associated with failure, and analysts forecasts are of poorer 
quality for firms approaching failure.   
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Dechow et al (1996) examine the forecast dispersion for firms subject to alleged 
violations of GAAP according to AAER.  They measure forecast dispersion as the 
standard deviation of analyst forecasts of current-year earnings reported in the 
month of the firms fiscal year-ends.  They compare the median dispersion of 
analyst forecasts in the three years before with the median dispersion of analyst 
forecasts in the three years following the year allegation of earnings manipulation 
is announced.  They find a significant increase in the dispersion of analyst 
forecasts for the alleged firms from pre-announcement period to post-
announcement period, but not for the control firms.    They thus suggest that 
investors revise downward their beliefs about both the firms future economic 
prospects and the credibility of the firms financial disclosures once the earnings 
manipulation is disclosed.   
 
Palmrose et al (2004) compare the forecast dispersion at the time of the firms 
restatement announcement and 45 days after the announcement for a sample of 
258 restatement firms.  They find a significant increase in the forecast dispersion 
for restatement firms after the restatement announcement, and they suggest that 
earnings restatement increases uncertainty around the restatement firms. 
 
Griffin (2003) examines the response of First Call financial analysts to corrective 
restatements and disclosures that lead to securities fraud litigation. He measures 
the response in terms of forecast coverage and forecast accuracy around a 
corrective disclosure. His sample is composed of 731 U.S. exchange-traded firms 
that are alleged of fraud in federal class actions with end of class period dates 
between June 27, 1994 and March 31, 2001.  He uses median EPS forecast 
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reported in each month for the current fiscal year to derive the forecast error. His 
results show that the number of analysts covering firms with corrective 
disclosures declines significantly in the months after the disclosure, but not in 
advance.   Moreover, the analyst forecast error is essentially unchanged prior to a 
corrective disclosure month, decreases significantly in the disclosure month and 
the following month, and changes little thereafter.  He suggests that financial 
analysts are reluctant to follow firms with the bad news of corrective disclosure, 
and that financial analysts demonstrate little ability to anticipate such bad news.   
 
However, few studies have attempted to explore the information in analyst 
forecasts about the subsequent earnings restatement by examining the properties 
of FAF for earnings restatement firms prior to the restatement announcements.  
This study aims to provide such supplemental evidence. 
2.3 Earnings restatement 
 
2.3.1 Background of earnings restatement 
 
A financial statement restatement occurs when a firm, either voluntarily or 
involuntarily, revises public financial information that was reported previously. 
Being a rewrite of the firms history, an earnings restatement suggests that the 
formerly filed financial statement lacks reliability.  Though not a new 
phenomenon, the earnings restatements due to accounting errors and irregularities 
have been growing in number and in significance during the past decade (see the 
third section for statistics).   
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Restatements can involve SEC-filed annual reports, which are audited by 
independent auditors, and quarterly reports (in most cases unaudited).  They can 
also involve the unfiled reports of interim quarters of the current fiscal year that 
were publicly announced before.  The avenues of correction of the misstatement 
include amended filings (10K/A or 10Q/A), which supersede the original financial 
statements, the 10K or 10Q in the subsequent period carrying the corrected 
number, or the form 8-K.  
 
2.3.2 Reasons leading to earnings restatement   
 
The restatement of financial statements can be elicited by a number of reasons.  
This study limits its scope to the earnings restatements resulting from either 
unintentional accounting error, defined as mathematical mistakes, oversight, or 
misuse of facts at the time the financial statements were originally prepared,1 or 
accounting irregularity, a term for intentional misstatements or omissions of 
amounts or disclosures in financial statements done to deceive financial statement 
users,2  or the pursuit of aggressive accounting in violation of GAAP.  Although 
some firms admittedly acknowledge fraudulent financial reporting in their public 
announcements, most firms will not do so.  It is therefore hard to distinguish 
between intentional manipulation and unintentional misinterpretation in some 
cases.  
 
                                                
1AICPA Professional Standards, AU @ 420.15 (American Institute of Certified Public 
Accountants 1998) 
2 SAS 53, The Auditors Responsibility to Detect and Report Errors and Irregularities.  SAS 82, 
Consideration of Fraud in a Financial Statement Audit. 
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The reasons leading to the earnings restatements can be categorized more 
elaborately as: improper revenue accounting, including premature recognition of 
revenues or even recognition of fictitious revenues; improper cost accounting, 
including improper recognition of costs or expenses, misstatement of inventory, 
other long-term assets or reserves, improper capitalization of expenditures and 
improper treatment of tax-related items; improper accounting in merger and 
acquisition; improper accounting for in-process research and development 
(IPR&D) at the time of an acquisition; reassessment of investments; and 
misclassification of accounting items or wrong record entries.  
 
Improper revenue recognition is found to be the most frequent cause of all the 
reasons mentioned above. This category includes instances in which revenue was 
improperly or prematurely recognized, or questionable revenue was recognized by 
mistakes or improprieties.  In the United States General Accounting Office Report 
(GAO Report 2002 hereafter), restatements due to revenue recognition problems 
constitute 38 per cent of the 919 earnings restatements arising from accounting 
errors or fraud from 1997 to June 2002.  Wu (2002) finds that of the 1,221 
earnings restatements from 1977 to 2000, 487 cases are caused by revenue 
recognition problems, representing the highest percentage (39 per cent) of the 
whole sample.  
 
Besides accounting errors, irregularity and aggressive accounting methods, normal 
corporate activities or presentation issues can also lead to earnings restatement; 
for example, general changes in accounting principles under GAAP, stock splits, 
dividend distributions, discontinuation of operations, change of the accounting 
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period, merger and acquisitions, and changes made for presentation purposes. 
However, restatements caused by these reasons do not reveal previously 
undisclosed and economically meaningful information to the investors, and do not 
directly signal lack of integrity or quality in the previous financial statements. 
Therefore they are excluded from the scope of this study.   
 
2.3.3 Growing number of restatements due to accounting misconduct 
 
Early studies on earnings restatement find modest number of restatements in the 
1970s and 1980s. Kinney and McDaniel (1989) examine firms that correct 
quarterly earnings in a footnote to their annual reports because of accounting 
errors from 1976 to 1985.  They identify reports with year-end restatement of 
previously issued quarterly financial statements sourced from the National 
Automated Accounting Research System (NAARS) database of annual reports. 
After excluding eight restatements related to prior fiscal year and two extreme 
outliers, they obtain 73 firms (178 quarters) that correct previous quarterly 
earnings due to material errors. 
 
DeFond and Jiambalvo (1991) examine firms making corrections of earnings 
overstatement errors that existed in a prior years annual report from 1977 to 1988. 
Their sample is obtained from a search of footnote disclosure of prior period 
adjustments in NAARS and Accounting Trends and Techniques (ATT) database, 
and 41 firms are identified.   
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Recent studies on earnings restatement made since the late 1990s identify a 
dramatically growing number of earnings restatements.  Turner and Sennetti 
(2001) use key-word searches throughout the financial statements in NAARS for 
restatements made from July 1987 to June 1995, and supplement their search with 
the restatements in 1981 to 1987 sampled in DeFond and Jiambalvo (1991).  After 
eliminating restatements that are other than error corrections and not related to 
material misstatement, their final sample includes 116 error firms, with the 
highest frequency in 1988 when 21 firms make earnings restatement.   
 
Palmrose and Scholz (2004) examine the firms that made first disclosure of 
possible restatements between January 1, 1995 and June 30, 1999 and 
subsequently filed amended 10-K or 10-Q with the SEC.  They obtain their 
sample from Lexis-Nexis News Library by using key-word searches for 
restatements and include additional sample firms discussed for restatements in 
other unnamed sources. Their final sample consists of 416 earnings restatements, 
with 384 searched from Lexis-Nexis searches and 32 from other sources.  The 
number of restatements rises from 43 in 1995 to 136 in 1999.  Of the whole 
sample, 34 per cent are identified as having improprieties in revenue recognition, 
28 per cent are for operating expenses adjustments, and 23 per cent are for in-
process R&D adjustments.  
 
Turner et al (2001) examine the firms making earnings restatement to prior annual 
earnings in their amended 10-K filings.  They search 10-K Wizard by key words 
for restatement within 10 words of financial statement.  After excluding those 
restatements not due to accounting errors or fraud, they identify a final sample of 
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362 restatements, with 104 in year 1997, 116 in year 1998 and 142 in year 1999.   
Of these restatements 15 per cent have problems in revenue recognition and 7 per 
cent have errors in restructuring charges.  Anderson and Yohn (2002) find 329 
firms during the period 1997 to 1999 that restate financial statements and file a 
10-K/A because of accounting errors, by searching 10-K Wizard for restated 
financial statements.  They include in their empirical tests only 161 restatements 
with available earnings and price data.  Among them revenue recognition 
problems account for 17 per cent of the earnings restatements and 11 per cent are 
due to errors in restructuring charges.  
 
Similarly, Agrawal and Chadha (2003) examine a sample of restatements 
announced from January 1, 2000 to December 31, 2001 by keyword searches 
from Lexis-Nexis, Newspaper Source and Proquest Newspapers.  They identify 
303 cases of restatements of quarterly or annual earnings because of accounting 
problems during the two-year period. 
 
The GAO Report (2002) uses Lexis-Nexis to search for restatement 
announcements and identify 919 restatements from January 1997 to June 2002 
that involve accounting errors or fraud.  The number grows from 92 in 1997 to 
225 in 2001, and the projected number for 2002 is 250.  The problem in revenue 
recognition is found to be the most common reason resulting in restatement, 
accounting for 38 per cent of the sample.  Cost or expense-related issues are the 
next most frequent reason, accounting for almost 16 per cent of all the sample 
restatements.   
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The Huron Consulting Group (2003) performs a keyword search for all 10-K/A 
and 10-Q/A filings in the EDGAR database from 1998 through 2002.  They refine 
their search to restatements due to accounting errors and exclude restatements due 
to accounting principles changes and non-financial related restatements. Their 
results include 993 restatements filed from 1998 to 2002, and the number rises 
from 158 in 1998 to 330 in 2002. Revenue recognition is shown to be the leading 
cause for earnings restatement, accounting for 20 per cent of the sample 
restatements.   
 
Wu (2002) obtains the sample of restatement firms by manual search of online 
news libraries including Lexis-Nexis, Dow-Jones Library and ABI/Info databases.  
She identifies a total number of 1221 earnings restatements due to accounting 
misrepresentation, irregularities, or errors from 1977 to 2001.  In her sample, the 
number of restatement firms is in single digit from 1977 to 1982, and remains 
stable at less than 50 from mid-1980s to mid-1990s.  The number soars to 96 in 
1998 and reaches 153 in 2001, with a peak of 204 in 1999.  When classified by 
reasons, 487 (40 per cent) of the restatements are caused by errors in revenue 
recognition, representing the largest category.  This is followed by improper 
record of costs or expenses, accounting for 463 (38 per cent) of all the 
restatements in the sample.  
 
In summary, various studies uncover a growing number of earnings restatements 
due to accounting errors or fraud from the late 1990s. They also find problems in 
revenue recognition one of the leading reasons for earnings restatement.  
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2.3.4 Market reactions to earnings restatement announcement and other 
disclosures of accounting errors 
 
When the accounting error or irregularity is publicly disclosed and the earnings 
restatement is necessitated, the market often reacts negatively in a sharp manner.   
Kinney and McDaniel (1989) compute cumulative abnormal stock returns (CAR) 
for their sample firms that make corrections to quarterly earnings reports in their 
year-end financial statement footnote.  The CAR is computed for each firm 
quarter from two days after the first erroneous quarterly earnings were reported to 
five trading days after the 10-K filing date.  Their results show a significantly 
negative CAR of -23.2% for the entire sample. 
 
Feroz et al (1991) analyze Accounting and Auditing Enforcement Releases (AAER) 
issued by the SEC between April 1982 and April 1989, which describe alleged 
violations of accounting provisions of the securities laws by 188 firms. They 
examine the CAR for 58 firms among the whole sample with available price and 
disclosure data.  They document a significant CAR of 12.9% from one day 
before to the day of the first financial press disclosures of the disputed accounting.  
They also document a significant CAR of -6% from one day before to the day of 
disclosure of SEC investigations, even though the market already has knowledge 
about the error at the date of disclosure of the SEC investigation. 
 
Dechow et al (1996) examine 92 firms subject to AAER for violations of GAAP 
by overstating their earnings from 1982 to 1992.  Among these firms, 26 disclose 
the earnings manipulation problems first in their earnings restatement 
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announcement.  For these 26 firms, the average market adjusted stock return on 
the day of the restatement announcement is -5.7%, at the significance level of one 
percent.  
 
Palmrose et al (2004) examine the market reactions to restatement announcements 
of 403 companies that filed amended 10-K or 10-Q from 1995 to 1999.  They 
document a significant CAR of -5.3% on the day of the restatement announcement 
and a significant CAR of -4% on the day after the announcement.  They also 
report negative CAR (with a mean of -17.4%) in the 120 trading days following 
the restatement announcement. They find that the severity of the reaction is 
associated with restatements that include negative information about management 
integrity and competence.  
 
Palmrose and Scholz (2004) document negative raw returns of -11% over the 
three-day window around the earnings restatement announcements of firms that 
restate annual or quarterly earnings in amended filings from 1995 to 1999. They 
provide evidence that the negative reactions are associated with shareholder 
litigation against the firms. 
 
Anderson and Yohn (2002) analyze 161 firms that restated financial statements 
and filed a 10-K/A due to accounting errors from 1997 to 1999.  They find a 
significant CAR of -3.5% on average during the seven-day window surrounding 
the restatement announcement.   
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In the official report of GAO (2002), the 689 firms that made earnings 
restatements between January 1997 and March 2002 suffered a 10% fall in stock 
prices over the three-day window around restatement announcement date. 
 
Wu (2002) reports a significant CAR of -11% for the earnings restatement firms 
over a three-day window surrounding the restatement announcement.  Moreover, 
her results show a downward pattern in stock price of the restatement firms 
starting from half a year prior to the restatement announcements, and a persistent 
negative post-announcement drift for up to four months.  She conjectures that the 
pre-announcement pattern hints at other value-reducing events the restatement 
firms have experienced before their announcements, for example, earnings 
warnings and SEC investigations or enquiries.  She also suggests that the post-
announcement drift may be due to the release of additional details pertaining to 
the restatement and investors incessant revision of their beliefs about the firms 
economic prospects. 
 
In summary, many empirical studies on earnings restatements report significantly 
negative abnormal market returns for the restatement firms over the short window 
around the announcement of earnings restatement.  Some studies report the 
continuous negative market drift in a longer horizon after the restatement 
announcement.  
 
2.3.5 Qualitative attributes and economic incentives leading to earnings 
restatement  
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There is mixed evidence on the qualitative information of the restatement firms, 
especially when the studies are conducted in different time periods. Kinney and 
McDaniel (1989) analyze the economic characteristics of firms that restate 
quarterly earnings in the footnote to their year-end financial statements.  They find 
that the earnings restatement firms are smaller, less profitable, slower in growth, 
have higher debt and face more serious uncertainties relative to their industries.  
DeFond and Jiambalvo (1991) report that restatement firms tend to have diffuse 
ownership, lower earnings growth, relatively fewer income-increasing alternatives 
within GAAP, and are less likely to have audit committees compared to control 
firms without restatements.  Turner and Sennetti (2002) find that their sample of 
firms that restate previously issued erroneous earnings from 1981 to 1995 have 
higher debt ratios and lower asset size, revenue, income, and profitability ratios 
compared with other firms in the same industry. 
 
Recent studies identify a growing trend of large firms making earnings 
restatement and the restatement firms tend to be high growth firms or in high 
growth industries (e.g., software industry).  GAO Report (2002) finds that the 
average size by market capitalization of a restatement firm increases from $500 
million in 1997 to $2 billion in 2002.  Richardson et al (2002) examine firms with 
earnings restatement involving only SEC filed annual reports from 1971 to 2000.  
Their results show that restatement firms tend to be high growth firms that are 
under great pressure to inflate earnings to meet or beat analysts expectations.3  
They also document that restatement firms have higher industry-year-adjusted 
                                                
3 Distinct from previous studies using earnings or revenue growth to measure the financial 
difficulties of restatement firms, Richardson et al (2002) use E/P and B/M ratios to examine the 
markets perceptions of future growth of these firms, and their results indicate that restatement 
firms have significantly lower E/P and B/M ratios compared with non-restatement firms. 
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leverage, have reported consistent increases in quarterly earnings and have 
consistently reported small positive earnings surprises in the period leading up to 
the alleged manipulation.  Yet they do not find difference in profitability or size 
between restatement firms and non-restatement firms.   
 
Other studies examining firms making earnings manipulation or accounting errors 
have similar findings. Kreutzfeldt and Wallace (1986) find that firms with 
profitability problems also have larger and more frequent accounting errors.  
Dechow et al (1996) find that firms subject to AAER by SEC have weakness in 
their internal governance structures relative to the control firms. They also find the 
manipulating firms have higher market to book ratios and are highly leveraged.  
 
Many previous studies suggest that financial distress can motivate management to 
engage in more aggressive reporting practices to raise external financing or to 
avoid violations of debt covenants.  Within firms there is great pressure for sales 
to meet quarterly growth goals. Individuals whose compensation packages are 
pegged to sales are also expected to chase sales targets.  DeFond and Jiambalvo 
(1991) find that accounting errors result from the same type of economic 
incentives that influence managers management of accruals, for example, bonus 
compensation incentive and debt covenant incentive. Richardson et al (2002) 
conclude that both explicit contractual arrangements such as bonus plans and debt 
covenants and heightened capital market pressures have created incentives for 
firms to engage in aggressive accounting principles. 4 
 
                                                
4 They measure four different variables as related to capital markets incentives: external funds 
raised; ex ante need for financing; historical trend in EPS growth; and pattern of quarterly earnings 
surprises. 
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In summary, empirical studies have found that earnings restatement firms have 
greater financial difficulties and face more pressure to achieve earnings targets.  
They are also relatively weak in their internal controls.  
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CHAPTER 3 RESEARCH QUESTIONS AND HYPOTHESES 
DEVELOPMENT 
 
3.1 Objectives and research questions 
 
We are interested to examine the role of financial analysts in earnings restatement 
in consideration of the serious consequences triggered by earnings restatements 
due to accounting errors, irregularities or aggressive accounting.  These 
consequences include drop in stock price, shareholder litigation and management 
turnover. We are particularly interested to examine whether the financial analysts 
(as market intermediaries) have performed their gatekeeper role (Coffee 2002) by 
reflecting in their earnings forecasts the information about the true financial 
performance of the restatement firms and their subsequent earnings restatements. 
 
Specifically, we aim to address the following four questions:  1). Do analysts 
earnings forecasts have information about the true financial performance of the 
restatement firms that was misstated?  2). Is there difference in the properties of 
FAF for restatement and non-restatement firms prior to the restatement 
announcement? 3). Does the market have aggregate wisdom about the 
circumstances leading to the restatement announcement and if so, has the market 
incorporated the information conveyed through the properties of pre-
announcement FAF for earnings restatement firms?  4). Are the properties of pre-
announcement FAF distribution for the restatement firms informative of the firms 
subsequent risk? 
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3.2 Hypotheses development 
                                         
3.2.1 Financial analysts knowledge of the restatement firms true earnings 
information  
 
Early studies on FAF suggest that financial analysts are experienced and effective 
in collecting and processing comprehensive information relevant to the firm, the 
industry and the economy to formulate their earnings forecasts (Fired and Givoly 
1982; Brown et al 1987a; Alexander 1995).   
 
However, empirical studies show that FAF is optimistically biased on average 
(Barefield and Comiskey 1975; OBrien 1988; Stickel 1990; Arbanell 1991). 
Various explanations to the forecast optimism have been suggested, such as the 
incentives of the financial analysts (Francis and Philbrick, 1993; Dugar and 
Nathan, 1995; Das et al., 1998; Lim, 2001), the cost of analyzing bad news 
(Griffin 2003) and the cognitive bias of financial analysts (Abarnell and Bernard 
1992).  
 
The analysts forecast bias can change with respect to certain irregular events. 
Griffin (2003) finds that the degree of optimistic bias in analysts forecasts 
decreases significantly in the month of the corrective restatement, but not before 
the restatement.  Espahbodi et al (2001) find that the optimistic bias in FAF for the 
bankrupt firms declines to insignificant levels by the year prior to the bankruptcy 
filing.  They attribute the decline to the increasing costs for financial analysts to 
report optimistic forecasts, such as negative reputation effect and possibility of 
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legal liability.  Contrary to their results, Moses (1990) finds that the bankrupt 
firms have larger optimistic bias in forecasts than the healthy firms from three 
years to one year prior to the bankruptcy.  He suggests that the managers of 
bankrupt firms withhold information about their bad performance, resulting in 
over-optimistic analyst forecasts.  
 
We examine the forecast error of FAF for the misstated period to investigate 
whether analyst forecasts reveal information of the true financial performance of 
the restatement firms despite the improperly reported earnings numbers.  Extant 
literature has different views on the roles and motivations of analysts in 
forecasting earnings.  One view is that analysts are motivated to forecast the 
reported earnings to improve their forecast accuracy, as their compensation is 
associated with their forecast accuracy (Stickel 1992, Wu 2003).  The other view 
is that analysts are motivated to reflect firms true financial information in 
earnings forecasts because of their reputation and career concerns.  Li (2002) finds 
that reputation and recognition are much more important than performance and 
efforts to analysts rankings and compensation.    Analysts reputation has been 
impaired following accounting scandals and restatements, and they are criticized 
for failing to report restatement firms accounting problems and true financial 
performance prior to the restatement announcement (GAO report 2002; Coffee 
2002; Cowen et al 2003). The GAO Report shows concern on the failure of 
analysts role in financial reporting procedure and criticism that analysts are 
unable to identify potential problems of restatement firms before the restatement 
announcement. The report posits that analysts face pressure to issue positive 
research reports due to the conflict of interests and the brokerage firms 
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compensation arrangements.  (GAO report 2002). Subsequently, SEC has 
approved NYSE and NASD rules to address issues involving analysts conflict of 
interests, and large U.S. investment banks have initiated analyst reforms to 
disclose analyst forecasting performance (Cowen et al 2003). Unjustified bias in 
analyst forecasts for firms that subsequently disclose the poor true financial 
information will bring negative reputation effects to analysts and increase their 
costs of issuing optimistic forecasts (Espahbodi et al 2001).  Criticism on analysts 
role following accounting restatements shows that the market expects analysts to 
issue forecasts that reflect the true financial situation of the firms and censures 
unjustified forecast optimism in light of information available to the analyst at the 
time of issuing the forecasts.   Analysts would also attempt to report true earnings 
situation of firms to avoid increasing reputation costs.   This paper adopts the view 
that analysts are motivated to report true earnings of earnings restatement firms 
under the criticism and pressure from market and regulatory institutions after the 
wave of accounting scandals.  
 
For the control purpose we compare the forecast error of the restatement firms 
versus a group of non-restatement firms in the misstated period.  We construct the 
group of non-restatement firms by matching each restatement firm with a firm 
from the same industry and of approximately the same size without a history of 
earnings restatement.  Matching on industry is desirable to control for industry-
specific effects on earnings forecast, as forecast uncertainty may be related to 
specific industry and forecast revisions may result from information of industry-
wide events (Bhushan 1989).  Matching on size is justified by the association that 
size can have with risk and analyst attention (Fama and French 1992; Bhushan 
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1989; Imhoff and Lobo 1992).  We also check the market-to-book ratio and P/E 
ratio of the two groups of firms to ensure that the group difference in forecast 
error is minimally influenced by factors other than our concern. 
 
We expect the analyst forecasts for restatement firms to exhibit less optimistic 
bias if the analysts are able to capture information about the restatement firms 
true earnings.  The reported earnings of the restatement firms are regarded as 
inadequate in the later reviews and are subsequently restated, and in more than 
75% cases of our sample, the reported earnings numbers are inflated compared 
with the subsequently restated numbers. The reported earnings of the non-
restatement firms remain unchanged as no accounting problems with the earnings 
numbers are identified.  Therefore we propose that if the analysts have 
information about the true financial performance of restatement firms and 
incorporate such information in their forecasts, the optimistic bias in the FAF for 
the restatement firms would be less serious than that for the non-restatement firms.  
 
We construct the null hypothesis as follows: 
1H : The forecast error of restatement firms is not different form that of non 
restatement firms.   
 
Failure to reject the null hypothesis may be due to the analysts lack of ability to 
collect information of the true financial performance about the restatement firms.  
It may also be due to the possible higher investment banking business that 
analysts get from the restatement firms.    Rejection of the hypothesis in favor of 
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more negative forecast errors of restatement firms would support the same 
argument. 
 




FEFE −=               
where E is the reported earnings for period t, and F  is the most current forecast 
for this period.  For the restatement firms the reported earnings are the misstated 
earnings that are subsequently restated, and for the non-restatement firms the 
reported earnings are the actual earnings of the firms during this period.  We 
aggregate the whole misstated period of each restatement firm in the calculation of 
the forecast error as the misstated period can span one quarter, several quarters, 
one year or several years.  In separate tests we will also group the restatement 
firms based on the length of the restatement period, i.e., the firms with restatement 
period less than one year and the firms with restatement period equaling to or 
longer than one year. 
 
3.2.2 The difference in pre-announcement analyst forecasts for restatement firms 
versus non-restatement firms 
 
The properties (e.g., accuracy, efficiency and dispersion) of FAF are shown to be 
associated with firms future performance and capture the firms risk aspects 
(Givoly and Lakonishok 1984). As analysts earnings forecasts are expected to 
                                                
5 We deflate the forecast error by the absolute value of the reported earnings rather than the price 
because the misstated period varies from quarters to years, and the reported earnings for the whole 
period is more adequate a deflator than the price at the end of this period.  We will use the price at 
the beginning of the period as a deflator in the sensitivity tests. 
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reflect macroeconomic, industry and firm-specific information, the properties of 
FAF may differ systematically across firms depending on the conditions faced by 
the firms. Moses (1990) proposes that the properties of analysts earnings 
forecasts reflect information relevant to predict future events.   
 
The event of earnings restatement provides a special setting to examine the 
information conveyed through FAF. The announcement of earnings restatement 
brings tremendously negative consequences to the restatement firms like stock 
price decline and shareholder litigation.  It is a signal of potential cost to be 
incurred on the restatement firms, such as litigation cost, SEC penalty, and 
monitoring cost.   Thus the restatement announcement can negatively influence 
the investors expectations on the firms future cash flows and therefore firm 
value. It also deteriorates investors perception of the managements credibility 
and the financial reporting quality, and thereby increases the firms cost of capital 
(Hribar and Jenkins 2004).  
 
We are interested to investigate whether the properties of pre-announcement FAF 
convey information associated with the conditions that lead to subsequent 
restatements.  To answer this question, we examine whether there is difference in 
the properties of the FAF for restatement firms and non-restatement firms. 
Specifically we examine three properties of the analyst forecasts: the forecast 
error, the forecast dispersion and the skewness of the forecast distribution. 
 
The earnings forecast studied hereof is the current-year forecast for the annual 
earnings of the year preceding the year in which the restatement is announced.    
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For example, if the earnings restatement is announced in year t, then we examine 
the analyst forecasts for year t-1 as the pre-announcement earnings forecast.     In 
the sensitivity tests we also test the analyst forecast of the earnings in the quarter 
immediately before the restatement announcement date.                                                                         
 
• Forecast error   
 
Previous studies on earnings restatement show that the restatements lead to 
decrease in expected future earnings and downward earnings forecast revisions 
(Hribar and Jenkins 2004, Griffin 2003, Palmrose et al 2004).  This illustrates the 
downward revision of the expected future cash flows, the expected growth rates, 
and the increasing doubt on the corporate managers competence and credibility 
following the earnings restatement.  
 
We investigate how the forecast error differs between the restatement firms and 
the non-restatement firms before the earnings restatement to find out whether 
forecast error reflects conditions leading to earnings restatement.  By using the 
restatement firms earnings forecasts in the previous period as control, Griffin 
(2003) documents a remarkable decrease in the optimistic forecast bias after the 
earnings restatements, but he does not find much change in forecast error before 
the earnings restatement.  We compare the forecast error of restatement firms and 
non-restatement firms before the earnings restatement announcement.  We 
propose that if the financial analysts have knowledge of the upcoming earnings 
restatement and reflect such information in their earnings forecasts, they will 
exhibit less optimistic bias for the restatement firms than for the non-restatement 
firms.  The null hypothesis is as follows: 
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2H : The forecast error of the restatement firms is not different from that of the 
non-restatement firms prior to the earnings restatement announcement. 
 
Failure to reject this null hypothesis, or rejection of the hypothesis in favor of 
more optimistic forecasts for restatement firms both suggest that the financial 
analysts earnings forecasts do not reveal information of the upcoming earnings 
restatement.  Likewise as in the first hypothesis, this would be due to either the 
financial analysts lack of ability to collect information about the possible 
earnings restatement, or their reluctance to release such information in their 
forecasts to maintain good relations with the management. 
 
We calculate the forecast error as the reported earnings minus the forecasted 
earnings, deflated by the price at the time of forecast (see Arbanell (1991), Das et 
al (1998) and Easterwood and Nutt (1999)).  We include the absolute value of the 
reported earnings as a deflator in the robustness test. 
=
−1tFE P
FE tt 11 −− − ,  
where 1−tF  is the mean of the current-year forecast for year t-1 across individual 
forecasts, 1−tE  is the reported earnings for year t-1, and t is the fiscal year in 
which the earnings restatement is announced.  Negative FE indicates optimistic 
bias in the earnings forecast and we expect a smaller 1−tFE  of the restatement 
firms than that of the non-restatement firms if analysts are able to foretell the 
impending restatement announcements and thus lower their earnings forecasts. 
 
• Forecast dispersion  
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Forecast dispersion reflects the divergence of the analysts beliefs about the firms 
future economic performance and is often interpreted as an earnings uncertainty 
measure. Studies on forecast dispersion find empirical evidence that forecast 
dispersion is associated with the firms earnings uncertainty and other commonly 
employed risk variables (Givoly and Lakonishok 1984, 1988; Daley 1988; 
Swaminathan 1991; Imhoff and Lobo 1992; Barron and Stuerke 1998).  
Uncertainty about future earnings stems from two sources: one is the difficulty of 
predicting future cash flows, the other is the noise created by the accounting 
system itself (Givoly and Laknoshishok 1988).   
 
Compared with the non-restatement firms, there is more earnings uncertainty 
about the restatement firms. Uncertainty arises from both the firms underlying 
economic performance as well as the credibility of its financial reporting 
(Palmrose et al 2004, Hribar and Jenkins 2004).  Previous studies have 
documented an increase in dispersion of FAF after the announcement of earnings 
restatement or the release of SECs accounting enforcement actions (Dechow et al. 
1996; Palmrose et al. 2004).   
 
Different from previous studies, this study looks into the forecast dispersion 
before the announcement of earnings restatement to examine whether it reflects 
greater uncertainty about the restatement firms prior to the earnings restatement. 
When the financial analysts formulate earnings forecasts for the restatement firms, 
they may have been influenced by the misstated earnings that were released 
publicly and thus have more disagreement with the restatement firms future 
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economic performance than with that of the non-restatement firms. If the pre-
announcement analyst forecast dispersion could reflect the uncertainty that is 
associated with the conditions leading to earnings restatement, we expect higher 
forecast dispersion of restatement firms than that of non-restatement firms. We 
construct the null hypothesis as follows: 
 
3H : The forecast dispersion of pre-announcement FAF is not different between 
the earnings restatement firms and the non-restatement firms.  
 
Following the suggestions of Christie (1987) and Imhoff & Lobo (1992), we 
deflate the standard deviation of individual current-year earnings forecasts for 
fiscal year t-1 by the stock price at the fiscal year end as a measure of forecast 









where itF ,1−  is the individual current-year forecast for fiscal year t-1,  P is the 
stock price at the fiscal year end, and t is the year of restatement announcement. 
  
Failure to reject the null hypothesis indicates that the pre-announcement analyst 
forecast dispersion is not able to capture the uncertainty arising from the 
conditions leading to earnings restatement.  
 
• Skewness of pre-announcement FAF distribution  
 
                                                
6 We include alternative measures of forecast dispersion such as the standard deviation deflated by 
the absolute value of mean forecasts and the undeflated standard deviation in the robustness tests. 
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This paper extends the study of pre-announcement FAF properties to the skewness 
of FAF distribution, though few previous studies have made such effort.7  We try 
to make a thorough study of the pre-announcement FAF distribution by further 
examining whether there is difference in the skewness of the FAF distribution for 
restatement firms and non-restatement firms. 
 
The skewness measures how the distribution of pre-announcement FAF deviates 
from symmetry and towards which end the individual forecasts are clustered. A 
left-skewed distribution indicates that there are more values concentrated on the 
higher end of the distribution, while the opposite holds for the right-skewed 
distribution.  If the uncertainty over earnings of restatement firms were to result in 
more cases of individual forecasts concentrated on the lower end rather than the 
higher end of the distribution, we would expect the FAF distribution for the 
restatement firms to be less left-skewed than that for the non-restatement firms.   
However, if only a few analysts are able to detect restatements and issue forecasts 
that are much lower than the consensus, then the earnings forecasts of restatement 
firms would be more left-skewed than that of the non-restatement firms.  In 
consideration of the two scenarios, we state the fourth null hypothesis as: 
 
4H : The skewness of the FAF distribution is not different between the restatement 
firms and the non-restatement firms. 
 
We develop the measure of skewness of analysts earnings forecast as follows:   
                                                
7 Abarnell and Lehavy (2003) examine the skewness of the cross-sectional distribution of analyst 
forecast errors, and their purpose of using the skewness measure is different from ours.  They try 
to use the statistical inferences of the forecast error distributions to explain the inefficiency of FAF. 









= , i=1, 2,n 
where itF ,1−  is the mean forecast for the annual earnings of year t-1 across n 
individual forecasts, itS ,1−  is the standard deviation of the analyst forecasts, n is 
the number of individual current-year forecasts for a specific firm, and t is the 
year of restatement announcement.  A negative SKW means that the distribution of 
analyst forecasts is left-skewed and that more cases are concentrated on the higher 
end of the distribution.   
 
3.2.3 The markets aggregate wisdom of the earnings restatement and its 
incorporation of the information about the restatement conveyed through FAF  
 
• Markets prior knowledge of the earnings restatement 
 
Since the restatement announcement often triggers a series of negative 
consequences, especially the negative responses in the capital market, we are 
interested to examine whether there is information leakage about the earnings 
restatement, i.e., whether some participants in the market have prior knowledge of 
this event. To do so we look into the abnormal returns prior to the earnings 
restatement announcements. Wu (2002) finds that the market starts to exhibit the 
decline four months ahead of the announcements and that the market has already 
had a cumulative abnormal return of -15% before the announcement date.  GAO 
Report (2002) explores the abnormal return from 60 days before to 60 days after 
the restatement announcement and finds a negative cumulative abnormal return 
from as early as 60 days before the restatement date.   In a similar manner, we also 
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investigate the cumulative abnormal returns over the window from 60 days prior 
to the restatement up to the event date (CAR (-60, 0)). If market has some prior 
knowledge of the restatement, then we expect CAR (-60, 0) <0.   
 
• Markets incorporation of the information about subsequent restatement 
conveyed through FAF distribution 
 
We are further interested to examine whether the uncertainty reflected in the 
distribution of pre-announcement FAF for the restatement firms is related to the 
markets aggregate wisdom of the restatement by testing the relation between pre-
announcement FAF dispersion and the CAR around restatement announcement. 
Atiase (1985) suggests that with respect to earnings announcement, the amount of 
pre-disclosure information is inversely related to the unexpected stock price 
response.  He uses firm size as a proxy for the amount of pre-disclosure 
information and his empirical results support this hypothesis.  Kim and 
Verrecchia (1991) and Malatesta and Thompson (1985) also construct theoretical 
models to demonstrate that public announcements that are anticipated manifest 
relatively smaller price responses at the time of the disclosure than 
announcements that are not anticipated. In the case of earnings restatement 
announcement in our study, we propose that if the pre-announcement FAF 
distribution reflects the uncertainty associated with conditions leading to the 
subsequent earnings restatement, and that the market is aware of such information 
before the restatement announcement, we would expect the market to react less 
negatively upon the announcement of earnings restatement. In other words, the 
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market response is mollified by the information about subsequent restatement 
reflected in the pre-announcement FAF distribution.  
 
We state the null hypothesis as: 
 
5H : There is no relation between the uncertainty reflected in the pre-
announcement FAF distribution and the market response to the announcement of 
earnings restatement. 
 
Defining CAR (-1, 1) as the cumulative abnormal return over a short three-day 
window around the event of restatement, we use this measure as the market 
reaction to earnings restatement.  We use forecast dispersion and skewness of 
forecast distribution as measures of uncertainty reflected in the pre-announcement 
FAF distribution.  DISP is the forecast dispersion for the year prior to restatement 
announcement, while SKW is calculated as the skewness of the distribution of 
earnings forecast for the year prior to restatement  announcement. 
 
The following basic regressions are constructed to test the null hypothesis: 
εββ ++=− DISPCAR 10)1,1(  
εγγ ++=− SKWCAR 10)1,1(  
 
Failure to reject the null hypothesis would suggest either little relation between the 
uncertainty reflected in pre-announcement FAF distribution and probability of 
earnings restatement, or little awareness of such relation in the market before 
restatement announcement.  On the other hand, a positive relation between the 
Chapter 3                                               Research Questions and Hypothesis Development 
 45
pre-announcement forecast dispersion and the market response would be 
consistent with our argument that current dispersion may capture the probability 
of restatement.   
     
3.2.4 Properties of pre-announcement analyst forecasts for restatement firms and 
the firms subsequent risk measures  
 
Previous studies suggest that the negative cumulative abnormal returns for the 
restatement firms can persist subsequent to the restatement announcement from 60 
days to around one year (Wu 2002, GAO Report 2002, Palmrose et al 2004).  We 
are therefore interested to investigate whether the uncertainty reflected in pre-
announcement FAF is informative about the restatement firms subsequent 
performance.  
 
We look into the association between the pre-announcement forecast dispersion of 
the restatement firms and their risk increase after the earnings restatement to 
investigate whether higher prior forecast dispersion translates into additional 
higher firm risk.  The additional risk is the difference in firms price variance and 
beta in post-announcement period compared with that in an early period prior to 
restatement announcement when the information about anticipated earnings 
restatement is rare. If greater earnings uncertainty reflected in the pre-
announcement forecast dispersion translates into higher additional risk of the 
firms, we would expect a positive correlation between the pre-announcement 
forecast dispersion and the growth in the return variance and beta.   
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In addition, we examine the partial relation between prior-restatement forecast 
dispersion and the post-announcement firm risk controlling for the firms prior 
risk.  Previous studies have found a positive relation between forecast dispersion 
and current measures of risk (e.g., Barron and Stuerke 1998) and suggest that 
forecast dispersion is a measure of information risk not captured by other 
contemporaneous metrics of risk. Thus the association between pre-announcement 
forecast dispersion and post-announcement firm risk can be camouflaged by the 
association between prior risk measures and forecast dispersion and correlation of 
risk measures over time.  We therefore control for the impact of pre-
announcement risk measures to test whether prior forecast dispersion is 
informative of the firm risk after the earnings restatement. 
   
We estimate the beta and return variance of restatement firms from day 1 to day 
250 after the restatement announcement, and from day 360 to day 120 before the 
restatement announcement respectively, and interpret the difference in beta and 
return variance in these two periods as the additional risk.  The setup of pre-
announcement period from day 360 to day 120 before the restatement 
announcement is made so as to estimate the pre-announcement risk of the 
restatement firms with minimal impact of anticipated information about the 
upcoming restatement at such an early date. 
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CHAPTER 4 DATA AND METHOD 
 
4.1 Sample of restatement firms   
 
Our primary sample of restatement firms includes all the US firms making 
earnings restatement due to accounting error, accounting irregularity, aggressive 
accounting methods and accounting fraud from 1990 to 2002.  We hand collect 
this sample by searching the Lexis-Nexis News Library and Factiva News 
Resources using the key word restate and its variations. We supplement the data 
with other sources like the General Accounting Office Report.  We exclude the 
earnings restatements due to changes in accounting policies arising from adoption 
of new accounting standards, stock splits, dividend distributions, discontinued 
operations, mergers and acquisitions, and change of accounting period.  Earnings 
that are restated for such reasons are not necessarily associated with the 
competence of oversight or credibility of the management and the quality of the 
financial reporting and therefore are not of interest in this study.  The initial 
sample size (before applying other filters) is 1340. 
 
Table 4.1 depicts an evident growing trend in the number of restatements over 
years.  Figure 4.1 shows that earnings restatements consistently range from 40 to 
70 over the first seven years, 1990 through 1996.  There is a breakout in 1997 with 
94 restatements.  The up trend continued in the following years and peaked at 203 
restatements in 2001.  This growing trend is similar to the findings documented in 
previous studies on earnings restatement (Wu 2002; Palmrose and Scholz 2004).   
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These restatement firms span various industries, with manufacturing and service 
industries being the top two most frequent categories, representing 39% and 23% 
respectively of the valid sample (see Table 4.2). The manufacturing industry 
includes electrical and electronic equipment firms, which are high-tech firms, and 
the service industry includes many business service firms.  The finance, insurance 
Table 4.1  Number of earnings restatements across years 
 Frequency Percent 
1990 67 5.0 
1991 71 5.3 
1992 72 5.4 
1993 47 3.5 
1994 67 5.0 
1995 39 2.9 
1996 65 4.9 
1997 94 7.0 
1998 111 8.3 
1999 157 11.7 
2000 182 13.6 
2001 203 15.2 
2002 165 12.3 
Total 1340 100.0 
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and real estate industries also represent a significant group (16%) of valid sample 
firms.  
 
  Frequency Percent Valid 
Percent 
Valid Agriculture, forestry & fisheries 2 0.2 0.2 
  Mineral industry 32 2.5 2.7 
  Construction 14 1.1 1.2 
   Manufacturing  462 35.8 38.8 
  Transportation, communications & utilities 102 7.9 8.6 
  Wholesale trade 39 3.0 3.3 
  Retail trade 73 5.7 6.1 
  Finance, insurance & real estate 187 14.5 15.7 
  Service industries 275 21.3 23.1 
  Public administration 4 0.3 0.3 
  Total 1190 92.2 100.0 
Missing  100 7.8  
Total  1290 100.0  
 
Among the restatement firms, about 60% are listed on NASDAQ, with NYSE 
firms representing another 30% of the valid sample (See Table 4.3). 
 
 Frequency Percent Valid Percent 
Valid NYSE 355 27.5 29.8 
 AMEX 126 9.8 10.4 
 NASDAQ 711 55.1 59.6 
 Total 1192 92.4 100.0 
Missing 98 7.6  
Total 1290 100.0  
 
Table 4.4 analyzes the reasons for earnings restatement.  Since some firms restate 
earnings for multiple reasons, the total number of firm-reasons exceeds the 
number of restatements in our sample. According to Table 4.4, revenue and cost 
recognition problems are two major reasons for restatement. This is identical to 
the findings in previous studies (GAO report, 2002; Wu, 2002). Moreover, there 
are 172 cases of admission of fraud, representing 13% of the sample. 
 
 
Table 4.2 Distribution of restatement firms across industries 
Table 4.3 Distribution of restatement firms across stock exchanges 




Frequency Valid Percent Percent 
Valid Other errors 116 7.8 7.5
Reclassification 18 1.2 1.2
Aggressive accounting policies 23 1.6 1.5
Revenue 495 33.6 32.1
Cost/Expenses 546 37.1 35.4
IP R&D 34 2.3 2.2
Investment reevaluation 99 6.7 6.4
Merger/Acquisition 141 9.6 9.1
Total 1472 100.0
Missing 70 4.5 
Total 1542 100.0 
Admitting fraud 172 12.8
 
Table 4.5 describes in detail the materiality of restatement of our sample firms. 
The materiality is measured in terms of number of quarters being restated and 
amount of earnings being restated.   The restated period varies from one quarter to 
as long as nine years.  The restated amount of earnings is calculated by subtracting 
the previously reported earnings from the corrected earnings numbers.  More than 
75% of the restatement firms adjust their earnings numbers downward, and the 




 Obs. Mean Min 25% Median 75% Max Std. Dev. 
Number of 


















359 -10.47 -3160.40 -0.70 -0.21 -0.03 4.38 166.85 
Table 4.4  Reasons for earnings restatement
Table 4.5 Materiality of earnings restatement
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Table 4.6 summarizes the major consequences of the restatement as reported in 
the news as well as cited in the firms SEC filings.  More than 18% of the firms 
are involved in securities litigation with shareholders, and more than 11% of the 
firms experience a management shake-up: the senior managers either resign or are 
ousted from their positions.   As some firms do not have complete follow-up 
reports on their restatement consequences, the results in this table would only bias 
towards underestimating the severity of the consequences.    
 
 
 Number Percentage 
Securities litigation 245 18.3 
Management change 158 11.8 
Auditor change 34   2.5 
Delisted/Filing for bankruptcy 49   3.7 
SEC investigation 40   3.0 
SEC suit against management/ fine for management   7   0.5 
Total observations 1340  
 
4.2 Data collection and sample attrition 
 
The financial analysts earnings per share forecast (FAF) data is collected from 
the Institutional Brokers Estimate System (I/B/E/S) detail history files. This 
database contains over seventeen years of forecast changes for US companies 
from more than 200 brokerage houses and 2000 individual analysts.  It assigns 
each analyst a unique and independent code, enabling us to identify the earnings 
forecasts from specific forecasters.   To make the calculation of standard deviation 
and skewness of the forecast distribution meaningful, we require that each firm 
have more than four forecasts for the year prior to the restatement announcement 
year.   
 
Table 4.6 Consequences of earnings restatement
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Data from COMPUSTAT North America are used to calculate market 
capitalization, market to book ratio, and P/E ratio.  Daily stock price data are 
collected from CRSP to estimate expected returns and abnormal returns on the 
restatement firms surrounding the announcement.  Set the restatement 
announcement date as event day 0, we collect stock price data from event day -
360 to day 250 for the restatement firms.   
 
Table 4.7 exhibits the attrition of our primary sample arising from data availability 
constraints. The samples used for hypothesis one and two are further limited by 
the non-restatement firms that fulfill the forecast data criteria.   
 
 
Total sample of earnings restatement firms  1340 
Less: observations without valid identifier(either ticker or CUSIP) (50)  
  1290 
Less: observations without available forecast data in IBES (526)  
  764 
Less: observations with less than four forecasts available (136)  
  628 
Less: observations without available CRSP data (65)  
  563 
Sample used for hypothesis one    266 
Sample used for hypothesis two  230 
Sample used for hypothesis three  343 
Sample used for hypothesis four  352 
 
4.3 Construction of control sample 
 
We construct a sample of non-restatement firms by matching each restatement 
firm with a firm in the same industry using two-digit SIC code, with the same 
fiscal year end, with the closest firm size (measured by market capitalization in 
the fiscal year before the restatement), and without a history of earnings 
restatement.  Meanwhile, we require the non-restatement firms to have forecast 
data for the misstated period and more than four forecasts for the year prior to the 
Table 4.7 Sample attrition
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restatement announcement year.  After imposing all these restrictions we obtain a 
control sample of 266 non-restatement firms that have available forecast data, of 
which 230 meet the requirement of having more than four forecasts for the year 
prior to earnings restatement.  Table 4.8 compares the basic characteristics of the 
two groups of firms, including the market capitalization, the market to book ratio 
and the P/E ratio in details.  It is shown in the table that the samples of restatement 
firms and non-restatement firms have no significant difference in their market 
capitalization, market to book ratio and P/E ratio.  This comparison helps to 
ensure that our results on the difference of analyst forecasts for the two groups of 
firms have minimum effect from the difference in firm size and growth prospect. 
 
 Mean Min 25% Median 75% Max Std. Dev. 
Market capitalization ($million)      
Restatement 
firms 











      
Market/Book ratio       
Restatement 
firms 











      
P/E ratio        
Restatement 
firms 











      
 
 
Table 4.8 Market capitalization, M/B ratio and P/E ratio of restatement and non-restatement firm
samples 






• Forecast error (FE) during the misstated period 
 
Forecast error for the misstated period is aggregated over the whole misstated 
period, regardless of its length.  We measure the forecast error for each firm as the 
difference between the reported earnings and the latest forecast, deflated by the 




FEFE −=  
where tE  is the reported earnings, and tF  is the latest forecast. The latest forecast 
is used to minimize the influence of stale forecasts (OBrien 1988).  As the 
misstated period varies from quarters to years, we use the absolute value of 
reported earnings rather than the stock price at the end of this period as the 
deflator.  In our robustness test, we repeat all tests with the undeflated forecast 
error and the forecast errors deflated by the price at the beginning of the 
restatement period. 
 
• Forecast error for the year prior to restatement announcement 
 
We further evaluate the forecast error for restatement and non-restatement firms in 
the year prior to the restatement announcement.  Following Abarbanell (1991), 
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Das et al (1998) and Easterwood and Nutt (1999), we calculate the forecast error 
for the year prior to restatement announcement as: 
=
−1tFE P
FE tt 11 −− − ,  
1−tF  is the mean of the current-year forecast for year t-1 across individual 
forecasts, with year t being the fiscal year in which the earnings restatement is 
announced. 1−tE  is the reported earnings for year t-1, and P is the stock price at 
the end of fiscal year t-1. We apply the absolute value of actual earnings as an 
alternative deflator in the robustness tests.  As an additional test to examine the 
distance of forecast earnings to the reported earnings, we also take absolute value 
of the difference between forecast earnings and reported earnings and then deflate 
it by the stock price. 
 
• Forecast dispersion (DISP) 
 
Various measures of forecast dispersions have been employed in literature.  
Following the suggestions of Christie (1987) and Imhoff and Lobo (1992), we 
deflate the standard deviation of individual current-year earnings forecasts for the 
year before the earnings restatement announcement year by the stock price at the 




















, i=1, 2,  n 
where itF ,1−  is the individual current-year forecast for fiscal year t-1,  P is the 
stock price at the end of fiscal year t-1, and t is the year of restatement 
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announcement. To make the standard deviation calculation meaningful, we 
require n to be no less than four forecasts for a particular firm.   Our hypothesis 
suggests that the restatement firms have a higher 1−tDISP  than that of the non-
restatement firms. 
 
We will apply alternative measures of forecast dispersion in the robustness tests, 
including the undeflated standard deviation and the standard deviation deflated by 
the absolute mean forecast.  
 
• Skewness of the FAF distribution 
 








= , i=1, 2,n  
where itF ,1−  is the mean forecast for the annual earnings of year t-1 across n 
individual forecasts, itS ,1−  is the standard deviation of the analyst forecasts, n is 
the number of individual forecasts for a specific firm in t-1, and t is the year of 
restatement announcement.  A negative SKW means that the distribution of analyst 
forecasts is left-skewed and that more cases are concentrated on the higher end of 
the distribution. Our hypothesis suggests that the distribution of the FAF for 
restatement firms has higher SKW than that for the non-restatement firms. For an 





−+ mean . 
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4.4.2   Comparison of the two groups of firms 
 
Our aim is to investigate the group difference in forecast error for the 
misstatement period and the year prior to restatement announcement between the 
restatement firms and non-restatement firms, as well as the difference in the 
forecast distribution for the two groups of firms. To do so we match each 
restatement firm with its corresponding non-restatement firm and compare the 
mean and median group differences in forecast error, forecast dispersion and 
skewness of forecast distribution. We use both t-tests and non-parametric 
Wilcoxon rank-sum tests to evaluate the group difference. 
 
4.4.3 Estimation of cumulative abnormal returns 
 
We apply the event study method in examining the market responses surrounding 
the earnings restatement announcement.  Set the day of the restatement 
announcement as the event day 0. We calculate the cumulative abnormal returns 
over (-60, 60) and (-1, 1) to measure the price performance surrounding the 
earnings restatement announcement.   
  
To derive the cumulative abnormal returns (CAR) we estimate 
itmtiiit RR εβα ++=  
where 
    itR = return on firm i on day t from the CRSP daily data, 
    mtR = return on the CRSP equally weighted index on day t, 
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    ii βα , = intercept and slope coefficient, respectively, for firm i, and 
    itε = a stochastic disturbance term. 
The intercept and slope parameters are estimated using the daily returns from day 
-360 to day -240 before the restatement announcement date (GAO report 2002). 
The magnitude of abnormal returns is then computed as 
∑ +−=
t
mtiiit RRCAR )]([ βα , where t is the event window that we examine.  
 
4.4.4 Multiple regressions 
 
To examine the relationship between market response and the uncertainty 
reflected in the FAF distribution, we employ multiple regressions controlling for 
the potential influence of the restatement-related information released in the 
announcement and certain firm charactersitics.   In the regressions the dependent 
variable is the market response to the restatement announcement CAR (-1, 1).  The 
independent variables include the specific measures of uncertainty derived from 
the FAF distribution (DISP and SKW), the magnitude of the restatement, length of 
restatement period, the firm size, the reason for restatement and the indication of 
fraud.  We specify the model as: 
 
jjjjjj AMOUNTQRTMKTCAPSKWDISPCAR ∆+++++=− 543210)1,1( αααααα
 
                      jjj FRAUDDUMREVDUM εαα +++ 76 ,  j=1, 2, 3m 
where 
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j CAR(-1,1) = the cumulative abnormal returns on firm j over three days around 
the restatement announcement; 
jDISP = forecast dispersion for firm j in the year prior to restatement 
announcement year; 
jSKW = the skewness of the prior year forecast distribution of firm j; 
jMKTCAP = firm js market capitalization at the end of the year prior to earnings  
                    restatement; 
jQRT = the number of quarters being restated for firm j (if a whole fiscal year has 
been restated, the number of restated quarters is four); 
jAMOUNT ∆ =the magnitude of the restatement scaled by firm js market 
capitalization, the magnitude of the restatement is calculated by 
subtracting originally reported net income from restated net income; 
jREVDUM =1 if firm j has accounting problems in its revenue recognition 
leading to earnings restatement and zero otherwise; 
jFRAUDDUM = 1 when the restatement firm j explicitly admitted the existence 
of fraudulent practices or irregularities in the restatement 
announcement and zero otherwise. 
 
The dummy variables of revenue recognition and fraud admission are constructed 
because previous studies show that firms with revenue problems or admitted fraud 
suffer more in the capital market at the time of restatement announcement (Wu, 
2002; Anderson and Yohn, 2002; Palmrose et al, 2004). 
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4.4.5 Correlation tests 
 
We employ partial correlation tests to examine the association between the 
uncertainty level reflected in FAF distribution of the restatement firms and 
subsequent firm risk controlling for the pre-announcement firm risk.  In addition, 
we test the association between the uncertainty reflected in the FAF distribution 
and the incremental risk of the restatement firms after the restatement 
announcement. The uncertainty embedded in the FAF distribution is measured by 
its dispersion and skewness, and the subsequent firm risk is measured by the beta 
and return variance of the restatement firms from day 1 to day 250 after the 
restatement announcement day.  The pre-announcement firm risk is measured by 
the beta and return variance of restatement firms from day -360 to day -120 prior 
to restatement announcement. 
 
The correlation of primary interest is that between DISP and BETA , 
DISP and RETVAR , SKW and BETA , SKW and RETVAR  controlling for prior 
risk, and the correlation between DISP and BETA∆ , DISP and RETVAR∆ , SKW 
and BETA∆ , SKW and RETVAR∆ , where 
 
BETA= the firms beta estimated over the period beginning from the day after the  
earnings restatement date and ending with day 250 after the earnings 
restatement; 
RETVAR= the variance of daily returns over the period from the day after the 
earnings restatement date and ending with day 250 after the earnings 
restatement; 
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∆BETA= the firms beta estimated over the period beginning from the day after 
the  earnings restatement date and ending with day 250 after the 
earnings restatement, minus the beta estimated from day -360 before 
the  earnings restatement date and ending with day -120 before the 
earnings restatement date; 
∆RETVAR= the variance of daily returns over the period from the day after the 
earnings restatement date and ending with day 250 after the 
earnings restatement, minus the return variance from day -360 
before the  earnings restatement date and ending with day 120 
before the earnings restatement date. 
 
4.4.6   Robustness tests: 
 
In our robustness tests, we repeat all tests using different measures of forecast 
earnings, forecast error and forecast dispersion.  We first substitute the mean 
forecast with the median forecast as a measure of forecast earnings in calculating 
the forecast error before the earnings restatement year.  Secondly, we leave the 
forecast error undeflated or deflate it with the absolute value of the reported 
earnings. Thirdly, we leave the forecast dispersion undeflated or deflate it with the 
absolute value of mean earnings forecast.  We evaluate whether our results are 
sensitive to the alternative measures. 
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CHAPTER 5 RESULTS AND ANALYSIS 
 
 
5.1  The analysts earnings forecast during the misstated period 
 
 
Table 5.1 compares the distribution of forecast error of restatement firms versus 
non-restatement firms during the misstated period. Three measures of forecast 
error are compared: the difference between reported and forecast earnings, the 
deflated difference and the absolute value of the difference. 
 
Group mean results in the second and third columns show that the mean forecast 
error is more negative for the restatement firms than for the non-restatement firms, 
though the difference is not significant.  The results indicate more optimistic 
forecasts for the restatement firms than for the non-restatement firms, even though 
the reported earnings for the restatement firms are subsequently found to be 
inadequate and in most cases inflated.    
 
Furthermore, Mann-Whitney U test results for both the deflated and undeflated 
forecast error in the fifth column show that analyst forecasts for restatement firms 
are more optimistic during the misstated period, with significance at 0.1 level.  
Not only are the financial analysts earnings forecasts unable to reflect the true 
earnings situation of the restatement firms when the earnings numbers are 
misstated, they tend, in fact, to be more optimistic.  Even though financial analysts 
are trained professionals with expertise and experience in collecting, processing 
and disseminating information about firms performance, their earnings forecasts 
for the restatement firms during the misstated period do not seem to offer insight 
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into the true financial performance of the restatement firms.  Being more 
optimistic towards the restatement firms, the earnings forecasts may mislead 
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(This table presents the forecast error of restatement and non-restatement firms in the misstated 
period based on the reported earnings.   For each cell in the second to fourth columns, the first 
row is the value of group means or mean difference, the second row is the t statistics and the third 
row is the p-value.   *indicates significance at 0.1 level, ** indicates significance at 0.05 level, and 
*** indicates significance at 0.01 level. Same rules apply in the following tables.) 
 
We have repeated the tests by including restatement firms that only restate annual 
earnings and restatement firms that only restate their earnings downward.  The 
results remain similar:  the mean and median forecast error of restatement firms is 
more negative than that of non-restatement firms though with less significance. 
 
Based on the non-parametric test results on yearly data (see Table 5.2), forecasts 
for the restatement firms show a larger optimistic bias in nine out of 13 years and 
the difference is significant in three years, 1990, 1996 and 2000.   
 
Various reasons can contribute to the optimism of financial analysts towards 
earnings restatement firms.  Analysts may not have sufficient information to 
Table 5.1: Forecast error of restatement and non-restatement firms during the misstated period
Chapter 5                                                                                          Results and Analysis 
 64
predict the true financial performance of the restatement firms (Griffin, 2003); 
they may have higher investment banking business from the restatement firms 
(Michaely and Womack, 1999); or they have other incentives to withhold bad 
news about the firms (Hribar and Jenkins, 2004).  Whichever is the case, it implies 
that the analysts are not competent or credible to reveal in their earnings forecasts 
information about the true financial performance of the restatement firms. 








1990 3.00 6.00 -1.732* 0.08 
1991 4.00 7.00 -1.567 0.12 
1992 4.20 6.80 -1.358 0.18 
1993 4.25 4.75 -0.289 0.77 
1994 3.67 3.33  0.218 0.83 
1995 5.00 4.00  0.577 0.56 
1996 2.00 5.00 -1.964** 0.05 
1997 9.38 7.63  0.735 0.46 
1998 9.70 11.30 -0.607 0.54 
1999 29.81 23.19  1.575 0.12 
2000 20.23 32.77 -2.986*** 0.00 
2001 72.40 72.60 -0.028 0.98 
2002 35.34 41.66 -1.247 0.21 
1999-
2002 
156.37 168.63 -1.178 0.24 
1997-
2002 
174.13 186.87 -1.162 0.25 
 
(This table reports the yearly non-parametric test results of group difference in forecast error in 
the misstated period.  Columns two and three show the mean rank of restatement firms and non-
restatement firms respectively and column four shows the Z statistics for the non-parametric 
difference in group means. ) 
 
5.2 Properties of analyst forecasts for the restatement and non-restatement 
firms prior to earnings restatement 
 
 
5.2.1 Forecast error for restatement vs. non-restatement firms 
 
Current-year forecasts for the year prior to earnings restatement show significant 
optimistic bias for both restatement and non-restatement firms, as shown in Table 
Table 5.2: Non-parametric tests of difference in forecast error (FE=
E
FE − ) by year. 
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5.3. This is consistent with earlier empirical evidence (e.g. Barefield and 
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firms  




































(This table reports the group difference in forecast error of restatement versus non-restatement 
firms in the year before the restatement announcement year. Results for two measures of forecast 
error are reported.  Column four shows the difference level, the t statistics and its significance.  




Moreover, analyst forecasts for the restatement firms prior to the restatement 
announcement are more optimistic than those for the non-restatement firms.  The 
difference in forecast error is significant at 0.05 level in the t-test and 0.01 level in 
the Mann-Whitney test.   This finding is robust to the measures of forecast error 
used. 
 
Studies like Griffin (2003) and Hribar and Jenkins (2004) document a downward 
adjustment of financial analysts earnings forecasts following the restatement 
announcement rather than prior to the restatement. In support of their argument 
that analysts respond to rather than foreseeing earnings restatement, our study 
finds that pre-announcement FAF for the restatement firms does not reflect 
information of the impending earnings restatement compared with that for the 
non-restatement firms. Not only that, financial analysts actually issue more 
Table 5.3: Forecast error for restatement and non-restatement firms in the year prior to 
restatement announcement 
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optimistic earnings forecasts for the restatement firms than for the non-restatement 
firms in the year before the earnings restatement.  Our finding is robust to various 
measures of FAF and forecast error. 
 
In the robustness tests, we also analyze the non-parametric test results for yearly 
comparison of group difference between restatement and non-restatement firms. 
Analysts earnings forecasts for the restatement firms are more optimistic than 
those for the non-restatement firms in 11 out of 13 years (see Table 5.4).  The 
difference is significant in three years, 1990, 1994 and 2000 at the 0.10, 0.05 and 
0.01 levels respectively.  Using the absolute measure of forecast error, the same 
result is found in 12 out of 13 years. And this excess optimism for restatement 
firms is significant for the period 1997-2002 and 1999-2002 at the 0.01 level.   
 
Our analysis of the analysts forecast error in the year prior to earnings 
restatement lends support to the argument in GAO Report (2002) that the financial 
analysts do not perform their gatekeeper role competently to alarm investors and 
help them reduce loss from earnings restatement.  This could reflect the analysts 
lack of knowledge of the firms true financial performance.  Or, this hints at the 
incentives and pressures analysts face to issue positive reports of the firms (GAO 
Report 2002). Our inference is consistent with the evidence in Coffee (2002) that 
financial analysts issue strong recommendations for restatement firms right before 









FE −  FE=
P
FE −  
















1990 4.00 7.75 -1.919* 
(0.055) 
6.50 4.00  1.279 
(0.201) 
1991 5.33 7.67 -1.121 
(0.262) 
7.17 5.83  0.641 
(0.522) 
1992 4.60 5.50 -0.490 
(0.624) 
5.40 4.50  0.490 
(0.624) 
1993 5.00 3.25  1.061 
(0.289) 
3.00 4.75 -1.061 
(0.289) 
1994 2.00 5.00 -1.964** 
(0.050) 
4.00 3.00  0.655 
(0.513) 
1995 4.40 6.60 -1.149 
(0.251) 
6.20 4.80  0.731 
(0.465) 
1996 5.00 6.00 -0.522 
(0.602) 
5.80 5.20  0.313 
(0.754) 
1997 5.20 5.80 -0.313 
(0.754) 
6.00 5.00  0.522 
(0.602) 
1998 8.38 8.63 -0.105 
(0.959) 
9.50 7.50  0.840 
(0.401) 
1999 23.20 26.88 -0.900 
(0.368) 
28.08 21.79  1.540 
(0.124) 
2000 18.79 30.96 -2.980*** 
(0.003) 
28.67 21.48  1.760* 
(0.078) 
2001 58.68 66.32 -1.184 
(0.236) 
67.56 57.44  1.569 
(0.117) 
2002 39.94 38.18  0.326 
(0.744) 




138.77 161.15 -2.238** 
(0.025) 




151.44 174.49 -2.212** 
(0.027) 
177.84 148.25  2.839*** 
(0.005) 
 
(This table reports the yearly non-parametric test results of group difference in forecast error in 
the year before the restatement announcement year.  Two measures of forecast error are used: the 
difference in forecast and reported earnings deflated by the stock price and its absolute form.  The 
fourth and seventh columns present the Z statistics for the non-parametric tests and the 
significance level for the two measures of forecast error respectively.  ) 
 
5.2.2 Forecast dispersion for restatement vs. non-restatement firms 
 
We find that restatement firms have larger forecast dispersion than non-
restatement firms and the non-parametric test results can reject the null hypothesis 
Table 5.4: Year-to-year non-parametric tests for forecast error difference in the year prior to the 
restatement announcement 
Chapter 5                                                                                          Results and Analysis 
 68
with significance at 0.1 level (see Table 5.5).  It indicates that analysts opinions 
are more diverse on the restatement firms future performance and that the 
forecast dispersion reflects higher earnings uncertainty around the restatement 
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The yearly data also provides support to the larger forecast dispersion of 
restatement firms than that of non-restatement firms before restatement 
announcement. The mean forecast dispersion of restatement firms is greater than 
that of the non-restatement firms in eight out of 13 years (see Table 5.6). Results 
of the t-test show that this difference is significant for two years, 1995 and 2000.  
Non-parametric test results show that the forecast dispersion of restatement firms 
is significantly larger than that of non-restatement firms in 1999-2002 at the 0.10 
level.   
 
The finding that restatement firms are associated with greater forecast dispersion 
than non-restatement firms prior to the restatement announcement suggests that 
greater earnings uncertainty exists in aggregated data even before restatement 
announcements.  This result extends Palmrose et al (2004) that finds an increase in 
forecast dispersion of the restatement firms after the restatement announcement 
compared to pre-announcement period.  It is plausible that the restatement firms  
Table 5.5: Difference in forecast dispersion of restatement and non-restatement firms prior to the
restatement announcement 
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Year Mean difference in 
forecast dispersion  (non-



















6.33 6.67  
-0.16 
(0.87) 
1992  .00408 
(0.96) 
(0.39) 
6.00 5.00   
0.52 
(0.60) 
1993  .00190 
(0.34) 
(0.75) 


















4.20 6.80  
-1.36 
(0.17) 
1997  .00956 
(0.93) 
(0.40) 
6.20 4.80  
 0.73 
(0.47) 
1998  .00226 
(1.06) 
(0.32) 


















57.92 67.08  
-1.42 
(0.16) 
2002  .00629 
(1.08) 
(0.29) 




















(This table reports the results of group difference in forecast dispersion in the year before the 
restatement announcement year for the two groups of firms.  Column two reports the t-test results 
and the significance level; column five reports the Z statistics for non-parametric test and the 
significance level. ) 
 
 
Table 5.6: Group difference in forecast dispersion of restatement versus non-restatement firms by 
year 
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are associated with pre-announcement events like SEC informal enquiry, auditor 
change or management turnover. Such irregular events tend to add uncertainty and 
increase disagreements of opinions among analysts. In contrast, the non-
restatement firms in the control group do not face such uncertainty of possible 
earnings restatement or loss of management credibility.  
 
5.2.3 Skewness of forecast distribution of restatement vs. non-restatement firms 
 
We find insignificant difference in the skewness of FAF distribution of 
restatement and non-restatement firms. The forecasts for non-restatement firms 
show signs of a left-skewed distribution with significance at 0.10 level, indicating 
that more individual earnings forecasts are concentrated on the higher end of the 
forecast distribution (see Table 5.7).  For the restatement firms, the forecast 
distribution is not significantly skewed, which means that earnings forecasts for 
the restatement firms are not typically concentrated on either end of the 
distribution.  The results are similar using the alternative measure of skewness 
level.  The difference in the skewness measures, however, is insignificant in both 
the t test and the non-parametric tests.  The results suggest that skewness of FAF 
distribution does not reflect more uncertainty of restatement firms over non-























































(This table reports the t-test and non-parametric test results for group difference in skewness of 
FAF distribution.  Results on the two measures of skewness are presented.  The fourth row shows 
the group difference in skewness, the t statistics and its significance level, while the fifth row 
presents the Z statistics in non-parametric tests and the significance level. ) 
 
5.3 Market reaction to earnings restatement and the uncertainty reflected in 
the properties of analyst forecasts 
 
5.3.1 Market reaction to earnings restatement announcement 
 
We find significant negative cumulative abnormal return on restatement firms in 
the three-day window around the restatement announcement date (see Table 5.8). 
This result is consistent with previous studies on earnings restatement (Wu, 2002; 
Anderson and Yohn, 2002; GAO report, 2002).  Moreover, firms that have 
revenue recognition problems or admit fraud in their accounting practices 
experience more negative abnormal returns surrounding the restatement 
announcement. Specifically, there is CAR of -7.0% for the whole sample of 
restatement firms with available CRSP data, while the firms that have revenue 
recognition problems or admit accounting fraud have CAR of -11.3% in the three 
day period.  For the sample firms with available I/B/E/S data and all other 
parameters to be used in the regression analysis, the cumulative abnormal return is 
Table 5.7: Group difference in skewness of forecast distribution 
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-3.9%.  Within this sample, the firms that admit fraud experience a CAR of -6.9% 




(This table reports the market reaction to the restatement firms in the three days surrounding the 
restatement announcement.  Column two reports the results for all the restatement firms sampled 
in this study, column three reports the results for the firms caught with revenue problems or 
admitted fraud, column four reports the results for the sample firms used in regression analysis, 
and column five reports results for the sample firms in the regression analysis that have revenue 
problems or admit fraud. ) 
 
Our findings on market responses are consistent with earlier studies (e.g. Wu, 
2002; Anderson and Yohn, 2002; GAO Report, 2002) that the market takes the 
announcement of earnings restatement as bad news and reacts strongly to the 
announcement.  The market reactions are economically significant and investors 
of the restatement firms can incur huge losses.  Restatement announcements also 
spur a series of shareholder litigations. Moreover, we have findings consistent 
with previous literature (Wu, 2002; Anderson and Yohn, 2002; Palmrose et al, 
2004) that the market punishes more severely the firms that manipulate revenue 
items directly and the firms that confess their fraudulent intention.  It is clear that 
these firms previous earnings numbers lack integrity and reliability, and serious 
doubt is cast on the competence and credibility of their corporate managers.  This 
evidence is reinforced in our multivariate regressions in the later session. 
 
 
Table 5.8: Cumulative abnormal return (CAR) from one day before to one day after the 
restatement announcement date 




or admitted fraud 
in the study 
 Sample firms used 
for the regression 
Firms with revenue 
problems or admitted 
fraud used for the 
regression 
N 563 283 343 176 
Mean -7.04%*** -11.26%*** -3.88%*** -6.90%*** 
Std. dev. 0.351 0.394 0.182 0.211 
T stat. -4.763 -4.810 -3.954 -4.343 
p-value 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
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Figure 5.1: Cumulative abnormal returns from 60 days before 















The investigation on restatement firms pre-announcement performance indicates 
that the market in aggregate may have some prior knowledge of the restatement. 
As shown in Figure 5.1, the sample restatement firms used in the regression 
analysis experience a decrease in abnormal returns from as early as 45 days before 
the restatement announcement, and the negative abnormal returns persist up to 60 
days after the announcement date.   
 
5.3.2 Market reaction and the uncertainty reflected in analyst forecast distribution 
 
We find a positive relation between analyst forecast dispersion and the market 
reaction and can reject the null hypothesis with significance at the 0.10 level.  
Higher analyst forecast dispersion is found to be associated with less negative 
market responses to the restatement announcement. If the increased analyst 
forecast dispersion reflects greater firm risk prior to the earnings restatement and 
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higher probability of restatement, efficient market hypothesis would predict 
alleviated reaction to the restatement announcement. From the multiple regression 
results in Table 5.9, we find that the short-term market response is positively 
related to the prior year forecast dispersion, indicating that the pre-announcement 
forecast dispersion provides a useful signal to the market about the earnings 
restatement.  The third regression specification that includes the change in 
earnings per share yields the highest adjusted R-square of 0.11 and the analyst 
forecast dispersion significantly explains market response at the 0.10 level.   
 
We also find that the short-term market response is positively related to the 
skewness level of pre-announcement FAF distribution of the restatement firms. 
This means that the market reacts to the restatement announcement less negatively 
if the firms have fewer forecasts concentrated on the higher end of the FAF 
distribution. It supports our hypothesis that the less left-skewed FAF distribution 
indicates more uncertainty prior to the restatement and the efficient market 
incorporates such information and thereby mitigates its reaction at the time of the 
restatement announcement. In all the three regression specifications the coefficient 
of the skewness of the analyst forecast distribution is positive as expected, and in 
the second and third specifications it is significant at 0.10 level (see Table 5.9).    
 
We find that firms that admit committing accounting fraud in their restatement 
announcement experience a sharper decrease in market value at the time of 
restatement announcement.  The coefficient of the fraud dummy is negative in all 
three regression models and is significant at 0.01 level in the third model.   When 
the uncertainty is partially resolved in the announcement of fraudulent accounting 
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practices together with the earnings restatement, market adjusts downwards in 
strong reaction to the offence that speaks of a breakdown of corporate governance.  
 
Results in the first regression model show that the market reacts more negatively 
to earnings restatements made after 1995. The year 1995 dummy variable is 
negative at 0.05 level in this model. Following Wu (2002), we construct the year 
1995 dummy variable to examine whether there is change in markets reaction to 
restatement announcements over the whole sample period.  Although various 
criteria can be applied in partitioning the sample, the year 1995 is chosen as a 
truncation point because in 1995 the Congress passed the Private Securities 
Litigation Reform Act to deter abuses in securities fraud class actions. Firms, 
however, find it easier to escape securities fraud liability (Perino 2002).   It is 
plausible that market is disappointed by fraud firms and exhibits stronger reaction 
as the accounting misconduct is revealed after 1995.  
 
Moreover, our results show that restatements with insufficient information of the 
restatement magnitude experiences more serious market reaction.  Consistent with 
Palmrose et al (2004), our findings suggest that failure to provide quantified 
information of restatement may signal more uncertainty around the restatement 
firms subsequent to the restatement announcement, and thus triggers more 
negative market reaction. As seen in Table 5.9, the amount dummy variable, 
AMTDUM, is positively related to the short-term market reaction. This suggests 
that the market reacts more negatively to restatements that did not provide the 
magnitude of restatement.   
 
Chapter 5                                                                                          Results and Analysis 
 76
Table 5.9: Regression results of the short-term market response on  the analyst 
forecast properties 
 

















































































∆EPS   0.011 
(0.143) 
(0.886) 
N 343 196 179 
R-square 0.056 0.066 0.106 
 
(This table reports the regression results of three regression models. CAR(-1,1) is the cumulative 
abnormal returns from one day before to one day after the restatement announcement, DISP is 
forecast dispersion for the year prior to restatement announcement, SKW is the skewness of 
analyst forecast distribution for the year prior to the restatement announcement, MKTCAP is the 
market capitalization at the end of the year prior to the restatement announcement, QRT is the 
number of quarters that have been restated, FRAUDDUM equals to one if the firm admits fraud in 
the announcement and zero otherwise, REVDUM equals to one if the firm has accounting 
problems in its revenue recognition and zero otherwise, YEARDUM is a dummy equals to one if 
the restatement is announced after 1995 and zero otherwise, AMTDUM equals to one if the 
restatement amount is provided and zero otherwise, ∆AMOUNT is the restated earning minus the 
originally reported earnings deflated by the market capitalization, and ∆EPS is the restated EPS 
minus the originally reported EPS.) 
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5.4 Pre-announcement analyst forecast properties and subsequent market 
performance of the restatement firms 
 
We further explore the relationship between analyst forecast properties and the 
subsequent risk measures of the restatement firms to investigate whether the 
uncertainty about the restatement firms reflected in forecast dispersion and 
skewness of forecast distribution prior to the earnings restatement captures the 
risk aspects of the firms subsequent to the earnings restatement.   
 
We find weak evidence that the pre-announcement forecast dispersion is 
positively related to the restatement firms increase in beta after the restatement 
announcement, as shown in Table 5.10.  We take the difference in firms risk 
measures before and after the earnings restatement as incremental risk that may be 
associated with the restatement announcement.  The result indicates that the 
uncertainty prior to earnings restatement as reflected in forecast dispersion can 
capture the increase in restatement firms beta after they announce the restatement.  
However, the result is only significant in the Spearman correlation test but not the 
Pearson correlation test.   Moreover, the pre-announcement forecast dispersion is 
not related to the increase in return variance of the restatement firms after the 
restatement.  On the other hand, the skewness of analyst forecast distribution prior 
to the earnings restatement has no significant association with the increase in beta 
or return variance of the restatement firms after the restatement announcement. 
 
Unreported results of partial correlation tests show that after controlling for the 
risk measures before earnings restatement, the pre-announcement forecast 
dispersion is not significantly associated with the firm risk in the post-restatement 
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period.    It suggests that the pre-announcement forecast dispersion mainly 
captures the firm risk prior to earnings restatement but not the subsequent firm 
risk if the pre-announcement risk measure is controlled.  Overall the results of 
correlation tests show only weak support that pre-announcement forecast 






















(This table presents the correlation between properties of analyst forecasts before the earnings 
restatement and the increase in firm risk measures after earnings restatement. For each cell in the 
table, the first and second rows represent the Pearson correlation and its significance level for 
two-tailed test, and the third and fourth rows represent the Spearman correlation and its 
significance level for two-tailed test.  BETA∆ is the BETA estimated from day 1 to day 250 after 
the announcement minus the BETA estimated from day 360 to day120 before the announcement.  
RETVAR∆ is the return variance over this period minus the return variance from day 360 to day 
120 before the restatement announcement.  ) 
 
5.5 Robustness tests 
  
Our robustness tests allow for alternative measures and definitions.  We substitute 
the mean forecast with the median forecast to test the forecast error in the year 
prior to earnings restatement.  We also try deflating the forecast error by the 
absolute value of the forecast earnings and by the price at the beginning of the 
misstatement period, and deflating the forecast dispersion by the absolute value of 
the mean forecast.  The results prove to be qualitatively identical, which means 
that the results in our study are robust to the different measures. 
Table 5.10: Correlation between the analyst forecast properties and increase in firm risk 
subsequent to earnings restatement   
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CHAPTER 6 CONCLUSION 
 
6.1 Major findings 
 
  
In chapter 5 we discuss in detail the results of our tests and their indications.  
These results can be highlighted as follows. 
 
Firstly, financial analysts have more disagreement on the forecast earnings of 
restatement firms than non-restatement firms before the earnings restatement, 
illustrated by larger forecast dispersion for restatement firms.  This finding 
extends the results in Palmrose et al (2004) that forecast dispersion of restatement 
firms increases after the restatement announcement.  Our findings suggest that 
forecast dispersion reveals information about the greater earnings uncertainty of 
restatement firms before the restatement announcement.  
 
Secondly, the forecast dispersion of restatement firms before the restatement 
announcement is associated with the increase in their firm risk subsequent to the 
restatement announcement. Restatement firms with larger forecast dispersion in 
the year before the earnings restatement have greater increase in beta after the 
restatement announcement. 
 
Thirdly, the forecast dispersion before the earnings restatement contains price- 
sensitive information about the subsequent earnings restatement.  Our regression 
results show that the market response to earnings restatement is mitigated by the 
larger forecast dispersion before the restatement announcement. This finding is 
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consistent with Malatesta and Thompsons (1985) proposition that partially 
anticipated events have alleviated market response.   
 
However, the analysts earnings forecasts do not provide information about the 
true financial performance of the restatement firms and their subsequent earnings 
restatement. By examining the analyst forecast error, we find that FAF for 
restatement firms are more optimistic than those for the non-restatement firms in 
the aggregated misstated period as well as in the year prior to earnings restatement. 
Our findings support the criticism in GAO Report (2002) and Coffee (2002) that 
financial analysts do not perform their gatekeeper role competently and even hint 
at serious conflicts of interest among the sell-side analysts. 
 
Our findings on the properties of FAF for restatement firms reinforce Lim (2001) 
that firms with more earnings uncertainty are associated with more optimistic 
forecasts as analysts endeavor to build management access for nonpublic 
information.  Restatement firms are found to have larger forecast dispersion and 
more optimistic analyst forecasts before the restatement announcement than non-
restatement firms.  This finding is consistent with the argument in Lim (2001) that 
analysts would report positively biased estimates even if the unfavorable forecasts 
are justified given the uncertain information environment. 
 
6.2 Implications of the study 
 
This study provides interesting implications in several aspects.  For researchers on 
analyst forecasts, this study evaluates analyst forecast properties with respect to a 
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special event, i.e., earnings restatement.   Few studies have made this effort 
because the earnings restatement data is not readily available.  Our findings of 
more optimistic analyst forecasts for restatement firms than non-restatement firms 
before restatement announcement shed light on the sources of forecast optimism 
in the conditions leading to earnings restatement.  Specifically, our results support 
Lim (2001) that analysts tend to issue more optimistic earnings forecasts to 
improve access to nonpublic corporate information in uncertain information 
environment. 
 
This study may be of interest to policy makers to regulate financial analysts 
responsibilities more effectively.  Our results on the analyst earnings forecasts 
reflect the incompetent gatekeeper role that financial analysts play in the event of 
earnings restatement.  Our evidence corresponds with that documented in the e-
mail messages of financial analysts who recommend restatement firms that they 
personally do not favor (GAO Report, 2002).  The National Association of 
Securities Dealers (NASD) and SEC have responded by launching investigations 
on analyst research and approving rules that address issues involving analysts 
conflicts of interest.  Our findings call for further and more effective actions from 
the regulation makers.   
 
This study may be of concern to investors, since they suffer the loss when firms 
make earnings restatement.  Our study conveys a warning message to investors 
who rely predominantly on financial analysts forecasts and recommendations to 
predict earnings restatement.   Indeed our study suggests that the analysts 
earnings forecasts would not help distinguish the earnings restatement firms from 
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the non-restatement firms beforehand.  Rather the diversity of analysts opinions 
could in the aggregate serve as indicator of greater earnings uncertainty of the 
earnings restatement firms.  Our results supplement the findings in Coffee (2003) 
that analysts issue buy recommendations to restatement firms before the 
restatement announcement and reinforce its conclusions that the objectivity and 
independence of analysts have been compromised by the conflicts of interests. 
 
6.3 Limitations of the study 
 
This study has its limitations as outlined below.  Firstly, like any other study on 
earnings restatement, our study uses hand-collected data of restatement firms from 
news sources.  There is inevitably subjective judgment during the data collection 
process, though we have tried our best to minimize the subjective errors and cross-
checked the accuracy of the data with the SEC filings.  We acknowledge the 
general lack of authority of news reports over some well-used academic databases, 
but given that there is no readily available database on earnings restatement, 
newswires are the most available sources.   
 
Secondly, our paper makes the comparative study by constructing a control group 
of non-restatement firms.  Though we have controlled for firm size, industry and 
fiscal year end, and shown that both groups have similar book-to-market ratio and 
price-earnings ratio, other cross-sectional differences between the two groups of 
firms may influence analyst forecasts.  For example, we did not control for the 
affiliation of analysts following the restatement and non-restatement firms, since 
this requirement will reduce our sample size substantially.  




Thirdly, as I/B/E/S data are recognized as biased towards large firms with 
sufficient investor following, our analysis on analyst forecasts may bias towards 
large firms as well.  Small restatement firms also lack CRSP and COMPUSTAT 
data easily.  However, this limitation should not undermine the contribution of our 
study to the broader market, since most investors are interested in large firms.   
 
6.4 Potential future research beyond the study 
 
We believe that studies on earnings restatement and financial analysts behavior 
offer room for future research.   
 
As we compare the analysts forecasts for restatement versus non-restatement 
firms in cross-sectional studies, future studies can focus on analyst forecasts for 
the restatement firms inter-temporally.  Such research would shed light on 
changes of analyst forecasts properties around earnings restatement.  
 
In addition to examining the earnings forecast, future research is proposed to 
investigate the financial analysts recommendations and other contents of their 
reports on earnings restatement firms.  It is plausible that the analysts raise 
concerns about the firms accounting practices in their reports rather than in the 
earnings forecasts.  Thus the research on analysts recommendations or opinions 
elsewhere in the reports would contribute to a more complete picture on financial 
analysts behavior with respect to earnings restatement. Since financial analysts 
earnings forecasts are highly related to their stock recommendations (Bradshaw 
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2000), we believe that our results would provide helpful inference for future 
studies on analyst behavior. 
 
Moreover, future studies could specify the identification of financial analysts to 
investigate how the reputation of financial analysts influences their forecasts for 
the restatement firms.  Stickel (1992) examines the relationship between 
reputation and performance of financial analysts and finds that members of the 
Institutional Investor All-American Team make more accurate earnings forecasts 
than other analysts.  Similarly we propose future research on the reputation of 
financial analysts and their forecasts for earnings restatement firms to have a 
better understanding of the factors influencing analysts behavior.    
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